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ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis examines the geopolitical position of two non-mainstream, populist 
Lithuanian parties, Labour Party and Order and Justice, in several parliamentary debates 
dealing with geopolitically important issues. The study is based on electoral cleavage 
theory with the pro-soviet/anti-soviet cleavage identified as the main cleavage in 
Lithuania that partly overlaps with the winners/losers of transition and urban/rural 
cleavages. In the frame of quantitative and qualitative content analysis, several analytical 
categories are introduced, including topics, ideas and tactics used by the representatives 
of the parties. The analysis showed that Labour Party hardly displays any characteristics 
that would qualify them as strikingly pro-Russian, populist or a combination of these two, 
perhaps due to its ongoing transformation into a mainstream party. In the case of Order 
and Justice, what differentiates them from other Lithuanian parties and makes it 
interesting from the point of view of the research are the ideas that can be recognized 
from their rhetoric: these partly show resemblance with the official rhetoric of the 
Kremlin and partly mirror common notions about Russia. Populism in the case of these 
parties seems to mean rather identifying with the mind-set of a significant part of the 
population. As for the role of the two parties in the geopolitical discourse, the study 
concludes that they represent a voice in geopolitical matters that is to some extent 
different from the rhetoric of the mainstream parties, but they are not consequent enough, 
do not have a coherent set of ideas and lack a firm stance based on it. Their behaviour in 
geopolitical debates is rather opportunistic. Although they use some ideas that may 
originate from the Kremlin (‘double standards’, ‘depicting the EU and NATO as 
colonizers’) there is no sufficient evidence to state that they act as agents of Russia. The 
parties’ relative passivity and moderation in these debates can be explained by their lack 
of interest in geopolitical issues and general ideological emptiness pointed out by analysts 
as well as their possible fear of ostracism in case of harshly contradicting the mainstream 
geopolitical discourse and their presence in the government during most of the debates.  
 
Keywords: Lithuania, Russia, geopolitics, populism, cleavages, parliamentary rhetoric 
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The role of populist parties in the geopolitical discourse in Lithuania 
 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Politics in Lithuania is strongly influenced by Russia both in a direct and indirect 
way. The identity of different parties is in many cases connected to the way they relate to 
Russia. Differently from Estonia and Latvia, the Russian minority in Lithuania is not 
significant, moreover, Lithuania granted citizenship to all of its inhabitants after regaining 
independence. Therefore Lithuania is less affected by Russian compatriot policy and there 
is no significant ‘ethnic Russian party’. Because of this, Lithuania is often neglected in 
analysing politics in the Baltic states, at least in studies that deal with Russian-Baltic 
relations (that make up a large share of the scholarship on the Baltic states). Nonetheless, 
there are other parties in the country which do not have an ethnic element neither in their 
name, nor in their constituency, however, their leaders (Viktor Uspaskich and Rolandas 
Paksas) are considered to be closely connected with Russia, often accused of being pro-
Russian and collaborating with the Kremlin.  
 
It has been observed that several far-right and far-left parties throughout Europe 
have contacts with the Kremlin (Krekó et al., 2014), (Klapsis, 2015). The topic came to 
the limelight when Hungarian MEP, member of the Jobbik party Béla Kovács was 
accused of spying for Russia. Kovács was the founder of the Alliance of European 
National Movements, the leaders of which, for example supported Russia’s annexation of 
the Crimea and operations in Donbass1.  
                                                          
1 According to Svoboda leader Tiahnybok „made „statements supporting the Russian sponsored separatist 
forces and support for the Russian Armed Forces occupation of Ukrainian territory”” letter of Oleh 
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While there is no significant far-right party in Lithuania, it cannot be ruled out that 
other parties can also have strong ties with Moscow. As S. Saari wrote: “In addition to 
clearly pro-Russian parties, the goal [of the Kremlin] was to establish close links with a 
whole spectrum of political actors in the region as to secure Russian influence in all 
conditions and to create rifts amongst local political actors” (Saari, 2011, p. 5). Although 
such accusations regarding Lithuania parties are articulated often, there is hardly any 
attempt to prove them credibly, with factual evidences. Therefore, it would deserve a 
closer look to examine the how these parties relate to Russia.  
 
The thesis examines the relation of these parties to Russia as a one-way 
relationship, without examining Russia’s activities as those are much more difficult to 
explore. The main aim is to find out (1) how the abovementioned parties position 
themselves between Russia and the West, (2) how do they understand Lithuania’s place 
in the world and (3) what are the ideas they represent in terms of the Western world (EU) 
vs Russia? An additional question is (4) whether they are trying to base their 
argumentation on social and ideational/ideological cleavages? 
 Geopolitical discussions in Lithuania mainly revolve around the question whether 
the country should be closely connected to the East (Russia) or West (Western Europe 
and US). While on the surface it may seem that such discussions are purely about power 
and strategy, this question is basically about identities: identification with the Western or 
the Orthodox civilization (in Huntington’s terms). On the other hand, geopolitical 
discussions are about power and strategy.  
In my opinion, such small countries as the Baltic states have to inevitably belong 
to a great power’s sphere of influence. Which one they choose, is most likely a matter of 
civilizational preferences or the costs and benefits of one and another option. I think both 
identity and material-practical aspects play a role in such debates. So in terms of 
international relations theories both conceptualism and realism could be applicable. 
However, instead of relying on international relations theories, I based my research on 
cleavage theory, in other words, I am focusing on the domestic, not the international 
aspect.  
                                                          
Tiahnybok , chairman of Svoboda to the the Chairman of the Alliance of European National Movements 
Bruno Gollnisch http://en.svoboda.org.ua/news/events/00010596/  
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My main argument is that the popularity of these parties is driven by a cleavage 
between the winners and losers of the regime change (this cleavage also overlaps with the 
urban-rural cleavage), the longing for a paternalistic state and social justice of the latter 
that is connected to the so-called ‘Soviet nostalgia’, the idealization of the Soviet period 
as more just, order-oriented with clearer rules. According to this logic, these are the losers 
of regime change refusing Western-style democratic institutions as well as the EU who 
are the most susceptible for the stance represented by these parties.  
The parties I mentioned above are neither far-right nor far-left, they are often 
classified as ‘populist’ or could be perhaps labelled ‘rent-seeking’. They are perceived as 
non-traditional or ‘new parties’ opposed to the traditional mainstream parties. Theory on 
populism and electoral cleavages will be used to understand their behaviour. The research 
attempts to shed light on the nature of these parties not extensively examined so far and 
would contribute to the scholarship on Russian-Lithuanian relations. 
Although the cleavage that mostly separates their voters from those of the 
mainstream parties, the pro-Soviet/anti-Soviet cleavage was originally between the 
Democratic Labour Party (the predecessor of the Social Democratic Party) and the 
conservatives, it has transformed into an opposition of the traditional and newcomer 
parties with the Social Democratic Party belonging to the “traditional” camp and their 
electorate being positioned somewhere in the middle in terms of pro-Russian/anti-Russian 
and pro-Soviet/anti-Soviet views (Ramonaitė, 2007a, p. 101); (Ramonaitė, 2007b, p. 36). 
Therefore it seemed more practical to leave LSDP aside in this analysis.  
 
 The study analyses the parties’ stance on Russia by looking at their rhetoric 
(whether it correlates with the official rhetoric of the Kremlin) and their policy choices in 
specific issues (whether those choices are favouring Russia). To examine the parties’ 
positions on these issues, stenographic records of parliamentary sessions available online 
are analysed applying content analysis method. 
 
 In the first chapter, an overview is given of the theoretical literature concerning 
the main concepts used in the thesis: populism and electoral cleavages and the chapter 
tries to establish the connection between populism, electoral cleavages and geopolitical 
orientation. Chapter 2 introduces the cleavages in Lithuanian society, the phenomenon if 
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populism in Lithuania, its perception and connection to the Lithuanian party system as 
well as the profiles of Labour Party and Order and Justice. Chapter 3 presents the material 
analysed in order to answer the research questions and the method (content analysis) used 
for carrying out the analysis. Chapter 4 introduces the analysed cases (domestic policy 
issues from recent years that are connected to Russia or Russian interests, such as energy 
policy projects, military questions and foreign policy issues) in detail and presents the 
findings. The last chapter discusses the role the parties in question play in geopolitical 
discourse and the relationship between populism and foreign policy orientation in 
Lithuania.  
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CHAPTER 1: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
 
1.1 Populism 
1.2. Electoral Cleavage Theory 
1.3 Populists and Cleavages 
 
This chapter gives an overview of the theory on populism, establishes a working 
definition of populism for the research, introduces electoral cleavage theory and attempts 
to trace the connection between populism and electoral cleavages and outline how 
populism and cleavages can be related to geopolitical choices on the theoretical level. 
Electoral cleavage theory was chosen because populism is closely related to the behaviour 
of the electorate (it is actually a product of the competition for the favour of the 
electorate). Approaching the question from the point of view of geopolitics and applying 
a realist or conceptualist international relations theory was also considered but it would 
have been difficult to connect it to populism that is generally regarded to be the main 
characteristic of the parties in question.   
 
 
1.1 Populism 
 
Populism is a highly debated concept and there are several approaches in the 
academic literature to define it. For example, Margaret Canovan writes that ʻthere is a 
good deal of agreement on which political phenomena fall into this category but less 
clarity about what is it that makes them populistʼ (Canovan, 1999, p. 3). As de Raadt et 
al. point out, ‘the fuzziness of the concept, its random use and the pejorative meaning of 
populism obscure the scientific and public debate.’ (de Raadt et al., 2004, p. 2) Due to the 
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pejorative evaluation of populism, it is often associated or conflated with demagogy 
(Stanley, 2008, p. 101). 
Kurt Weyland distinguishes three strategies of conceptualization: cumulative, 
radial and classical (Weyland, 2001, p. 2). Cumulative means that a phenomenon needs 
to correspond a set of characteristics in order to be classified as populism (using the 
logical operator ‘and’); radial concepts operate with the logical operator ‘or’: a 
phenomenon can be classified as populism if it corresponds one or some characteristics, 
but not necessarily all; and finally, classical concepts identify the primary element of the 
concept, thus classical concepts operate with ‘minimal definitions’. 
Definitions of populism are usually cumulative, incorporating ideological, 
economic, technical etc. characteristics. As there are notable differences between Latin 
American, Western European and Central and Eastern European populism, it would be 
difficult to arrive to a definition that enumerates all the possible characteristics and 
applicable to all cases. Therefore I will attempt to arrive to a classical concept where the 
characteristic traits of populism emanate from one central characteristic, the ‘essence’ of 
populism.  
 
In the following, I am trying to give an overview of some of the scholarly literature 
on populism in order to discover its most characteristic traits that can form a base of a 
working definition for the purpose of this research.  
 
One of the most prominent experts of populism is Margaret Canovan, who 
dedicated a book to the topic of populism. In her book, Canovan distinguishes seven types 
of populism and argues that ‘the only common themes across all seven types are a resort 
to appeals to the people and a distrust of elites (Canovan 1981: 264)’ (cited by (Taggart, 
2003, p. 5)). 
Canovan interprets populism as the manifestation of one of the two faces of 
democracy: the redemptive face (the other being the pragmatic face)2. The redemptive 
face is more idealist and is connected to the principle of ‘vox populi vox Dei’ (Canovan, 
1999, p. 10) and promises to radically improve people’s life (‘the promise of a better 
                                                          
2 This distinction is based on the work of Michael Oakeshott’s distinction about the ‘politics of faith’ and 
the ‘politics of scepticism’. (M. Oakeshott, The Politics of Faith and the Politics of Scepticism, New 
Haven, Yale University Press, 1996.) 
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world through action by the sovereign people’ (Canovan, 1999, p. 11)), while the 
pragmatic face concentrates on sustaining law and order, democratic institutions and the 
optimal functioning of the state. According to Canovan, it is the ‘inescapable tension 
between them that makes populism a perennial possibility’ (Canovan, 1999, p. 1).  
She mentions that ‘(…) populism is often seen as a travesty of democracy, perhaps 
posing dangers to the whole system’, but argues that both faces are essential to 
democracy, so populism cannot be dismissed as a pathological form, a ‘travesty of 
democracy’ (Canovan, 1999, p. 12), as ‘its pretensions raise important issues’ (Canovan, 
1999, p. 1) and ‘populism accompanies democracy like a shadow’ (Canovan, 1999, p. 
16). 
According to Canovan, populist movements ‘involve some kind of revolt against 
the established structure of power in the name of the people’ (Canovan, 1999, p. 3) and 
‘(…) populism challenges not only established power-holders, but also elite values’ 
(Canovan, 1999, p. 3) 
Canovan points out, that it is important to bear in mind, that ‘populism understood 
in this structural sense can have different contents depending on the establishment it is 
mobilizing against. Where economic policy is concerned, for example, populists in one 
country with a hegemonic commitment to high taxation to fund a generous welfare state 
may embrace an agenda of economic liberalism, while other populists elsewhere are 
reacting against a free market hegemony by demanding protectionism and more state 
provision’ (Canovan, 1999, p. 4). 
 
Paul Taggart (Taggart, 2003) distinguishes six characteristic features of populism 
(cumulative definition): hostility to representative politics, identification with a 
‘heartland’ (an idealized conception of the community they serve), lack of core values, 
reaction to the sense of extreme crisis, self-limiting quality, highly chameleonic nature. 
He also draws attention to the connection of populism and Euroscepticism: 
‘Euroscepticism has often taken anti-elite form championing the mass demands for more 
representation and less integration. I take these three political forces [protest over fuel 
prices, anti-globalization, Euroscepticism] as indicative of populism across Europe and 
they will serve as examples in the paper of populist potential’  (Taggart, 2003, p. 2) The 
reason for this, he argues, is that ‘[t]he complexity of the institutional structures and the 
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fact they do not accord with domestic political institutions makes the architecture of the 
EU not only a distant one, but also a foreign one for populists’ (Taggart, 2003, p. 11). 
 
De Raadt, Hollanders and Krouwel, who conducted a study based on the 
programmes of 6 Western European (French, German, Dutch, Belgian, Swiss, Austrian) 
parties de Raadt et al., 2004) define populism ‘as a political ideology critical of 
representative democracy but not necessarily antidemocratic’, claiming that populism is 
more than mere political tactics or style of political communication that seeks to be 
popular and appeal to a wide range of people by saying what people want to hear or by 
simplifying political matters3 (unlike some scholars such as Canovan 19814; Taggart 
20005; Jagers and Walgrave 2003).  
Populism is operationalised into three core dimensions: ‘populists combine an 
appeal to ʻthe peopleʼ with anti-establishment critique and a call for a more direct link 
between political leaders and citizens.’ (de Raadt et al., 2004, p. 0)  
They note that it is in line with the views of Canovan who understands populism 
ʻas an appeal to “the people” against both the established structure of power and the 
dominant ideas and values of the societyʼ (Canovan 1999: 3 cited by (de Raadt et al., 
2004, p. 1)). According to the authors, this appeal to the people is against the 
establishment and its values and calls for a direct link between the political leadership 
and the people. It is 'not merely an opportunistic electoral strategy, but part of a wider 
ideologically founded critique.’ (de Raadt et al., 2004, p. 1) In order to identify the parties 
that are populist (as usually only radical right wing parties are labelled populist), they 
developed three core dimensions of populism: (appeal to the people, anti-establishment 
attitude and pro-direct democracy stance)’ (de Raadt et al., 2004, p. 1).  
 
Jagers and Walgrave identify the sovereignty of the people as the core element of 
populism, in the favour of which all the other elements of democracy - the rule of law, 
the division of power or respect for the rights of minorities – are rejected because they 
                                                          
3 As the authors point out, this understanding could lead to an amorph interpretation of populism, as it 
’automatically leads to the conclusion that all political parties are populist as it is one of the crucial functions 
of political parties to offer straightforward and clear political alternatives to the electorate.’(de Raadt et al., 
2004, p. 2) 
4 Canovan: Populism, New York, Harcourt Brace, 1981. 
5 Taggart, P. (2000) Populism, Buckingham: Open University Press. 
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confine the people’s sovereignty.’ (Jagers and Walgrave, 2007, p. 337) By emphasizing 
the direct ties of the populist leader(ship) with the electorate, populist politicians 
‘reinforce public distrust towards the institutions of representative democracy 
(parliament, government, political parties, etc.)’ (Jagers and Walgrave, 2007, p. 338). It 
leads to the simplistic understanding of politics, as ‘they nurture the idea that all problems 
would be easily solved if only the political will was present.’ (Jagers and Walgrave, 2007, 
p. 338)  
 As we can see from the literature outlined above, populism is understood as either 
an ideology or as a political style/technique of gaining and exercising political power. If 
interpreted as an ideology, the main element of it is the appeal to the people or an anti-
establishment stance. In the same time, it is emphasized that it does not oppose 
democracy, but rather absolutizes it to the principle of sovereignty of the people as one 
of the main principles of democracy. For a working definition of populism, the following 
core elements are chosen: an ideology based on anti-establishment stance in the name of 
the people within the frames of democracy. A similar ideology that rejects the notion of 
democracy is closer to authoritarianism.  
 
 
1.2. Electoral Cleavage Theory 
 
 The next concept that has to be examined is the one of political cleavages. I am 
trying to give an overview of some of the prominent works on cleavage theory and 
cleavages in the post-communist countries, especially in Lithuania.  
 There is relatively not much debate about the concept of cleavages: scholars 
generally understand it as the connection between certain groups of population (based on 
social position or values) and parties that base their electoral strategy on the division 
between these different groups. The mechanism of the formation of cleavages is a much 
more contested issue, with a bottom-up (society-driven) and a top-down (elite/party-
driven) approach. Different scholars emphasize different sides of the equation, but it is 
not disputed that pre-existing societal divisions and conscious party strategy are both 
indispensable for the ‘functioning’ of political cleavages. 
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 The study of Seymour Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan Cleavage Structures, Party 
Systems and Voter Alignments. An Introduction from 1967 can be regarded the founding 
text of cleavage theory. They were investigating how conflicts are translated into party 
systems and how parties make the latent contrasts explicit in the existing social structure 
(Lipset and Rokkan, 1967, p. 5). Parties are perceived as ‘alliances in conflicts over 
policies and value commitments’ (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967, p. 5).  
The four cleavages they describe as critical for European political culture are the 
centre-periphery, the state-church, the land-industry (urban-rural) and the workers-
employers (class) cleavages’ (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967, p. 35).  
According to the authors, the cleavages influence the formation of party systems. 
One of the crucial theses of Lipset and Rokkan is that Western European party system 
‘froze’ in around 1920, in the wake of the extension of the suffrage and remained 
relatively unchanged until the 1960s (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967, p. 50). 
 
Allan Zuckermann in 1975 (Zuckerman, 1975) pointed out the main dilemma of 
cleavage theory: the conflict of the bottom-up and top-down approaches. (The standpoint 
represented by Lipset and Rokkan was closer to the top-down approach.) As Zuckerman 
notes, there is disagreement in the literature concerning the link between social division 
and political cleavage in the sense of a ‘chicken and egg’ problem: are political parties 
mapping social division or are they creating them or at least hasten the process of social 
division? (Zuckerman, 1975, p. 236). 
 
Kevin Deegan-Krause examined not only the abstract concept of cleavage, but 
also its applicability to post-communist countries. He describes cleavage as follows: 
‘[r]esearch on cleavage most often entails the search for self-conscious demographic 
groups sharing a common mind-set and distinct political organization.’ (Deegan-Krause, 
2006, p. 2) 
Deegan-Krause lists other proposed categories from the scholarly literature that – 
besides the four outlined by Lipset and Rokkan – could function as basis of cleavages: 
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‘generational difference and education level (Inglehart 19976), economic sector (Kriesi 
19987) and gender (Brooks 20068).’ (Deegan-Krause, 2006, p. 6) 
Summarizing academic discussion on the topic, Deegan-Krause notes that 
although cleavages in post-communist Europe ‘bear some similarity to those of industrial 
democracies, they differ in ways that have important theoretical implications. The first 
challenge is to establish whether any form of cleavage exists in the region.’ (Deegan-
Krause, 2006, p. 8), mainly because the existence of large ‘catch-all parties’.  
 He notes that in several European post-communist societies, the divide over 
authoritarianism and democracy is also prevalent (Deegan-Krause, 2006, p. 10), and there 
is generally a wider range of issue divides compared to Western Europe together with a 
greater diversity of combinations of these issues (Deegan-Krause, 2006, p. 10), that 
results partly from historical circumstances and partly from the weakness of the  structural 
roots of many divides (Deegan-Krause, 2006, p. 10). He lists typical post-communist 
cultural issue divides such as ’the role of the church, abortion, pornography and 
consumerism, all filtered through a lens of decades of communist restrictions.’ (Deegan-
Krause, 2006, p. 9) 
 
Herbert Kitschelt also examined electoral cleavages in post-communist countries. 
He describes the connection between cleavages and electoral strategies of parties: ’A 
political cleavage is characterized by parties that offer competing messages that appeal to 
electoral constituencies divided by their position in the social structure, their ideological 
outlook, and their propensities to get involved in political action’ (Kitschelt, 1992, p. 11) 
Back in 1992, Kitschelt suggested that there would be links between voting patterns and 
the way how people can adapt to the new circumstances of market economy: ‘Those who 
expect to become ‘winners’ of the market system are likely to endorse libertarian/pro-
market policies and parties, whereas potential ‘losers’ will search for protection from the 
process of privatization and market dependence’ (Kitschelt, 1992, p. 26). So he suggests 
                                                          
6 Inglehart, R. 1977. The Silent Revolution: Changing Values and Political Styles among Western 
Publics.Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. 
7 Kriesi, H. 1998. The Transformation of Cleavage Politics. European Journal of Political Research 33: 
165-85. 
8 Brooks, C., Nieuwbeerta, P., and Manza, J. 2006. Cleavage-Based Voting Behavior in Cross-National 
Perspective: Evidence from Six Postwar Democracies. Social Science Research, 35: 88-128. 
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a cleavage characteristic for post-communist countries that is absent in Western European 
democracies examined by Lipset and Rokkan.  
 
 Robert Rohrschneider and Stephen Whitefield summarize the ‘conflicting 
interpretations regarding the number and character of party cleavages in Central Eastern 
European states: (a) there are no coherent party cleavages (Elster et al., 1998; White et 
al., 1997)9 or only multiple, country-specific cleavages depending on national contexts 
(Lawson, Römmele, & Karasimeonov, 1999)10; (b) there is one single ideological 
cleavage in the region as a whole over support for, and opposition to, liberal regime 
change (Kitschelt, 1992; Kitschelt et al., 1999; Marks et al., 2006)11; and (c)  there exist 
a number of common cleavages across the region supplemented by some national 
specificities (Evans & Whitefield, 1993; W. L. Miller, White, & Heywood, 1998) 
(Rohrschneider and Whitefield, n.d., p. 282)12’.  
In their research based on an expert survey of 87 parties in 13 post-communist 
democracies, Rohrschneider and Whitefield found that (differently from other post-
communist countries) the urban-rural cleavage is one of the most important conflict lines 
in Lithuania  (Rohrschneider and Whitefield, n.d., p. 298), together with the welfare and 
the pro-market/anti market dimension. It can be also concluded, that rural and anti-market 
and urban and pro-market positions respectively coincide (Rohrschneider and Whitefield, 
n.d., p. 294). The anti-market and anti-democratic position also coincides with 
representation of the losers of the new order (Rohrschneider and Whitefield, n.d., p. 285). 
 
Ian McAllister and Stephen White found in their survey on social cleavages in 20 
established and emerging democracies, including post-Soviet states13 that from the four 
cleavages identified by Lipset and Rokkan, the centre-periphery and urban-rural divisions 
are unimportant regarding positioning on the left-right scale (McAllister and White, 2007, 
p. 207) and conclude that ‘the social cleavages of the emerging democracies appear to 
have avoided the territorial conflicts based on urban-rural and centre-periphery divisions 
                                                          
9 (Elster et al., 1998; White et al., 1997) 
10 (Lawson, Römmele, & Karasimeonov, 1999) 
11 (Kitschelt, 1992; Kitschelt et al., 1999; Marks et al., 2006) 
12 (Evans & Whitefield, 1993; W. L. Miller, White, & Heywood, 1998) 
13 Unfortunately, among other countries, Lithuania was excluded from the analysis due to the lack of 
some specific data.  
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which were common in the established democracies in the early part of the twentieth 
century (McAllister and White, 2007, p. 212). As Lithuania was excluded from the 
analysis, I cannot consider this view representative for my case.   
 
Evans and Whitefield summarize the different theories about the emergence of 
political cleavages: top-down (cleavages originate from the elite and political 
institutions), mezzo (organizations of civil society play a key role in the genesis of 
cleavages) and bottom-up (macro-sociological factors are crucial). As they comment, the 
first two approaches had been dominating the academic discourse as they offered a more 
reasonable explanation of the mechanisms of cleavage formation. However they took the 
third, bottom-up, socio-centric approach (Evans and Whitefield, 2000, p. 46). They offer 
the following explanation: in the circumstances given in the post-communist countries 
(abundance of parties and candidates, pre-existing ideological preferences, these 
preferences associated with different sectors of post-communist societies, lack of social 
organizational links between parties and voters, low levels of information about particular 
parties and institutional effects), parties choose strategies based on pre-existing voter 
preferences and try to present themselves to the electorate in such ways that will resonate 
with voters’ interests (Evans and Whitefield, 2000, pp. 60–61).  
 
Enyedi represents the top-down approach, claiming that ‘cleavages would not 
exist without elites conceptualizing the conflict situation’ (Enyedi, 2005, p. 699) and 
views parties as ‘combiners’, ‘political actors combining interests, values, cultural 
milieus and social networks’ (Enyedi, 2005, p. 699), emphasizing differences or 
identifying symbols that unite various groups (Enyedi, 2005, p. 700).  
Enyedi’s modell is the following: ‘(…) the overall cleavage structure of a political 
society results from the interplay between three factors: political entrepreneurs, the pre-
political preferences and structures of a society (the raw material political entrepreneurs 
work with), and the constraining institutional structure. Political entrepreneurs combine 
interests, values, formal and informal social structures into political camps. They do so 
with the dominant aim to gain public office, and therefore they forge alliances that enable 
them to rise above the threshold of power’ (Enyedi, 2005, p. 700). Parties can impact  
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cleavage structure, but they are also constrained by the pre-existing societal patterns 
(Enyedi, 2005, p. 717). 
 
Mindaugas Jurkynas defines cleavage as ‘a political division among citizens 
rooted in the social structure and affecting electoral preferences. Cleavages can trigger 
political disagreements and become bases for partisan divisions’ (Jurkynas, 2004, p. 281).  
He adds that ‘cleavages need an agent, often a political organization to become salient’ 
(Jurkynas, 2004, p. 281), as parties politicize it, translate it into politics. He differentiates 
‘cleavage’ from ‘issue divide’: ‘a cleavage must be a permanent and non-contingent 
societal conflict translated by political agents.  
  
I see the role of pre-existing social divisions in cleavage formation as crucial: 
those are the prerequisite of party strategies that seek to make political capital out of 
cleavages. For example, it would be difficult to exploit an ethnicity cleavage in an 
ethnically homogenous country. It is also important to bear in mind that cleavages in post-
communist countries differ from those of Western European democracies, perhaps are 
more plastic, as a result of the lack of longstanding democratic traditions and historical 
cleavages that, according to Lipset and Rokkan, 'froze' in the beginning of the 20th century 
and were still prevalent in the sixties. This plasticity of cleavages and the possibility of 
parties to rearrange existing voting patterns is excellently illustrated by Enyedi’s analysis 
of the turn of the Hungarian Fidesz from a liberal, anticlerical, leftist to a right-wing, 
authoritarian, Christian democratic party.  
 The articles reviewed support my argument about the urban/rural and 
winners/losers cleavage that is being exploited by populist parties, namely the Labour 
Party (Viktor Uspaskich) and the Order and Justice (Rolandas Paksas).  
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1.3 Populists and Cleavages 
 
In this section I am trying to trace the relationship between populism and 
cleavages, in other words, how populist parties make use of societal cleavages and/or 
create them for their own purposes.  
As outlined in the section about populism, populists represent an anti-
establishment and anti-elite stance which, by its nature appeals to those that consider 
themselves the losers of the current political-economic system. It means that populists’ 
electoral basis includes mainly disadvantaged groups: this is usually the rural and 
peripheral population regarding the urban/rural and centre/periphery cleavages. It was 
also mentioned in the section about cleavages that in post-communist countries, 
winners/losers of regime change is an important cleavage (Kitschelt, 1992) 
(Rohrschneider and Whitefield, n.d., p. 285). Hans-Georg Betz has mentioned that 
populist parties often base their strategy on societal cleavages and try to appeal to both of 
winners/losers by offering something to both groups (Betz, 1993, pp. 419–420). In the 
specific Lithuanian case, Mindaugas Jurkynas pointed out that disadvantaged groups 
(rural/periphery/losers) support the populist parties (Jurkynas, 2004, p. 285).  
 
Euroscepticism is often connected to populism as Euroscepticism is also anti-
elitist by its nature and criticizes the lack of representation in the EU, as popular 
representation (direct democracy) is one of the key tenets of populism. 
It was noticed in a research by Balcere et. al. that a lot of the parties operate with 
the concept of ‘heartland’ (typical populist concept pointed out by Taggart) that can be 
an idealized picture of the Soviet Union (Balcere et al., 2012, p. 16).  
 
The losers of the regime change, those that are disappointed not only with the 
current government but the whole system that followed communism are thus susceptible 
to Eurosceptic ideas and naturally tend to look back to the communist time, the social 
equality and security guaranteed (Ramonaitė, 2013, p. 280) by the paternalist state 
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(compared to the capitalist order when people have to rely on their own initiative that 
brings with it bigger social inequalities).  
Euroscepticism inevitably brings with it some kind of geopolitical reorientation: 
the geopolitical structure is often perceived as a bipolar one (perhaps as a remnant of the 
Cold War) and disappointment with the EU and the West and nostalgia for the Soviet 
Union can manifest in a turn towards today’s Russia as a counterpole.  
As it has been indicated (Ramonaitė, 2013, p. 265) that pro-Soviet and anti-Soviet 
positions constitute an important division in post-Soviet societies, it is evident that 
populist parties try to make use of this cleavage or even promote it. (In the case of 
Lithuania, Ainė Ramonaitė states that the assessment of the Soviet period is the most 
important cleavage in society (Ramonaitė, 2007a).) My research is oriented to the activity 
of the parties, not the attitude of the electorate, so it applies the top-down approach of 
cleavages: I am going to examine if the parties in question try to capitalize on or enhance 
this division in their parliamentary speeches and how they tie it to geopolitical 
alternatives.  
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CHAPTER 2: THE LITHUANIAN PARTY SYSTEM 
 
 
2.1. Cleavages in Lithuania 
2.2. Populism in Lithuania and the Perception of Populist Parties 
 2.2.1 Features of the Electoral System Promoting the Spread of Populism 
 2.2.2 The Perception of Populism in Lithuania 
2.3. The Party Profiles of Labour Party and Order and Justice 
  
  
This chapter introduces electoral cleavages in Lithuania and explain how 
cleavages (particularly the pro-Soviet/anti-Soviet cleavage) are related to geopolitical 
preferences in the case of Lithuania. It shall also point out what peculiarities of the party 
system and electoral behaviour influence the success of populist parties in the country 
and how these parties are perceived. The last section introduces the party profiles of 
Labour Party and Order and Justice. 
 
 
2.1. Cleavages in Lithuanian Society 
 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, electoral cleavages in Eastern Europe are 
different from those in Western European societies because of the different historical 
circumstances that were prevalent in the formation period of cleavages. In this section I 
will introduce the particularities of electoral cleavages in Lithuania.  
 
Algis Krupavičius notes about the situation until 2001 that with the tendency of 
ideologically similar parties to merge, ‘[i]n most cases new challengers to the existing 
parties have had a limited number of options from the ideological perspective. On the one 
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hand, they could establish themselves by mixing several traditional ideological 
approaches or accepting extreme ideological positions; on the other hand, they could base 
themselves on structural cleavages and/or on non-ideological grounds’ (Krupavičius, 
2005a, p. 193). According to Krupavičius, the major cleavages in Lithuania are the 
left/right socioeconomic cleavage, the urban/rural and the religious cleavage 
(Krupavičius, 2005b, p. 124).  
 
Jurkynas observed that with the elections in 2000, the dominant issue divide in 
Lithuanian politics has transformed from a value-laden to a socioeconomic one (Jurkynas, 
2004, p. 279). He lists the following politically salient issue divides in Lithuanian society: 
transitional issue divide (the Soviet apparatus and the Sąjūdis14 and its successor parties; 
dominant during 1990-1997), religious, labour/capital and rural/urban; however, 
according to the author, ‘these issue divides still need continuous political 
institutionalization in order to become cleavages’ (Jurkynas, 2004, p. 293). He mentions 
that the urban/rural and the protectionist/free market divide were politicized by the 
Liberal Union (former party of Rolandas Paksas, head of the Order and Justice) and the 
Lithuanian Peasant Party. According to Jurkynas, the urban/rural conflict overlaps with 
the protectionist/free market division (Jurkynas, 2004, pp. 283–284), as well as the 
winners/losers, the centre/periphery cleavage (Jurkynas, 2004, p. 285), (this is in 
accordance with Rohrschneider and Whitefield’s view), and these social groups have anti-
establishment sentiments and tend to support populist parties15. The winners/losers of 
transformation issue divide was manifested in the presidential elections of 2002 and 2004 
and the elections to the European Parliament of 2004 where the Labour Party skimmed 
off ‘the cream of socio-economically disadvantaged and anti-establishment votes.’ 
(Jurkynas, 2004, p. 294) Jurkynas prognosticated back in 2004 that EU-related issues can 
become a divide for politicians to exploit in the future (Jurkynas, 2004, p. 294). He points 
to the signs of dissatisfaction among the electorate (especially in rural areas) that gives 
                                                          
14 Sąjūdis: the Lithuanian independence movement in the late 1980s and the early 1990s. 
15‘(…) the “losers” of the market reforms – the unemployed, low-salary employees, and the rural population 
– express their negative political attitudes towards the political elite. Some of them vote for leftist parties 
while some of them do not vote at all. Yet, support for Paksas in the provinces was clearly convincing 
(Prezidento rinkimai 2003). Thus, the urban/rural issue division is exploited mostly by the LVP [Lithuanian 
Peasant Party] and LLS [Liberal Union of Lithuania].  The clear social structure and electoral behaviour 
serve to illustrate the emerging cleavage’. (Jurkynas, 2004, p. 285)  
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room for populist, anti-establishment parties: ‘The success of Paksas and the fact that a 
TV comedian came fourth in the presidential election of 2002 revealed an 
underrepresented societal dissatisfaction. (…) However, continuing high levels of support 
for the Labour Party and pro-Paksas politicians signals serious discontents among the 
losers of transition in the countryside, provinces and South-Eastern Lithuania. 
Dissatisfaction with the current state of political, economic and social affairs leaves the 
electoral market open for new parties with populist appeal, such as the Liberal Democrats 
[now called Order and Justice] and the Labour Party. Both are new in the political system 
and both appeal for support from the dissatisfied.’ (Jurkynas, 2004, p. 292)  
 
According to Tõnis Saarts, in Lithuania the major cleavages are the socio-
economic cleavage and the communist/anti-communist cleavage; the urban-rural 
cleavage and the clerical/anti-clerical have a secondary importance, while the ethnic 
cleavage and the centre/periphery play a marginal role (Saarts, 2011, p. 97). Saarts also 
notes that in Lithuania the once essential communist/anti-communist cleavage has been 
’somewhat overshadowed by a socio-economic divide’ (Saarts, 2011, p. 96). Historically, 
there was ’a nationalist, anti-communist, market liberal and Catholic camp on the one 
side (Homeland Union), and a more cosmopolitan, rather anti-clerical camp on the other 
side, which was also more favourable towards the communist past (Democratic Labour 
Party – today’s Social Democratic Party). However, the situation changed in the early 
2000s when both blocks lost legitimacy and with the emergence of new parties, the socio-
economic cleavage was pushed into the centre (Ramonaite, 2006). (…) An urban-rural 
cleavage has also played a considerable role in Lithuanian politics, manifested mostly 
through several populist parties that appeal to rural voters.’ (Saarts, 2011, p. 96) 
 
Ainė Ramonaitė writes that ’using a methodologically strict definition of political 
cleavages, the only political division in Lithuania closely resembling a cleavage in the 
Rokkanian sense of the word, is the communist-anti-communist conflict’ that dates back 
to the time of the Soviet occupation: those whose family was repressed during the Soviet 
period tend to vote for the Homeland Union, while those who consider that they used to 
have a better life under Soviet rule prefer to vote for the Democratic Labour Party or the 
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Social Democrats.16 In addition to that, ‘religious, rural-urban and ethnic divisions have 
some importance in shaping voting behaviour in Lithuania’ (Ramonaitė, 2006, p. 77). She 
adds that ethnic parties are not significant and that the ethnic cleavage overlaps with the 
left-right cleavage as ethnic minorities tend to vote for left-wing parties (LDDP and 
LSDP) (Ramonaitė, 2006, pp. 77–78) The religious cleavage (church attendance) can also 
be reduced to the left-right dimension (Ramonaitė, 2006, p. 78). About the urban-rural 
cleavage she writes that it was ‘almost non-existent in Lithuania at the beginning of the 
party system formation, but its importance has been increasing together with growing 
differences in the quality of life in the largest cities and in rural areas’ (Ramonaitė, 2006, 
p. 78). However, already in the first half of  the nineties, ‘the leftist rural population was 
inclined to vote for the Democratic Labour Party rather that the Social Democrats, while 
the rightist rural electorate preferred the Christian Democratic Party to the Homeland 
Union’ (Ramonaitė, 2006, p. 79). The Lithuanian Peasants Party was trying to represent 
the interests of rural voters, but it was not influential at the national level (Ramonaitė, 
2006, p. 79).  But later the ‘rural voters have switched their support to the Labour Party 
and the Union of Peasants and New Democracy (‘Vilmorus’ post-election survey 2004 
(Ramonaitė, 2006, p. 80)’. According to the data of the 2004 EP elections, the Labour 
Party was much more popular in the countryside than in the capital (44.1% in the 
countryside and only 16.3% in Vilnius), while Paksas’s Liberal Democratic Party (the 
later Order and Justice) had similar results in Vilnius and in the countryside (6.6% in 
Vilnius and 6.8% overall) (Ramonaitė, 2006, p. 79). 
According to Ramonaitė, in the early 1990s the left/right conflict reflected rather 
the communist/anti-communist cleavage than socioeconomic ideologies, however, the 
parties later adjusted their economic policies accordingly, and a ‘major shift of the 
dominant conflict dimension from communist-anti-communist to socioeconomic divides’ 
(Ramonaitė, 2006, p. 81) was observable. However, differently from Western Europe, the 
left-right dimension is still rather tied to values and moral questions such as the 
‘assessment of the communist regime, church attendance and national pride’ (Ramonaitė, 
2006, p. 81). In the same time, there was another shift in the system that was very aptly 
                                                          
16 M. Degutis, How Lithuanian Voters Decide: Reasons behind the Party Choice. In. A; referred by 
Ramonaite, A. (2006). The development of the Lithuanian party system: from stability to perturbation, in 
S. Jungerstam-Mulders (ed.), Post-communist EU member states: parties and party systems (69-90). 
Aldershot; Burlington, VT: Ashgate. 
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summarized by a young journalist in one of Ramonaitė’s interviews: ’Before, there was 
a contraposition between Labour Democrats and the Homeland Union. They were like 
opposite poles, plus and minus, and now they agree on the main, most important 
questions. The differences between the left and the right have vanished. Nowadays there 
are traditional forces and some kind of adventurers like Paksas, Uspaskichas…’17. 
Ramonaitė sees the reason of the transformation of party system in the distrust for 
political parties and political elite and in the decline of the main, communist/anti-
communist cleavage that opened up the electoral market for new parties (Ramonaitė, 
2006, p. 84), but also emphasizes the socioeconomic reasons: ‘A new split between 
traditional and new political actors appears to have in part a socioeconomic foundation 
since the new populist parties attract most of their support from the poor rural population. 
An emerging division between modern and growing cities and a stagnating countryside 
partially overlaps with the communist-anti-communist cleavage. To some extent, new 
parties and political actors such as Paulauskas, Paksas or Uspaskich, are a replacement of 
the Labour Democrats for those who are disenchanted with the current regime and feel 
nostalgic about the Soviet past’ (Ramonaitė, 2006, p. 85). 
The influence of the parties in the polarization along cleavages (top-down 
approach) also plays its role: as the political elite is less polarized in the communist/anti-
communist axis than the population and the influence of value orientation depends on 
whether the elite manages to actualize the value conflicts in the competition, it decreases 
the significance of this difference to voter behaviour (Ramonaitė, 2007a, p. 141). 
 
Ramonaitė also devoted an article (Ramonaitė, 2013) to the pro-Soviet/anti-Soviet 
cleavage where she is trying to establish what factors influence the attitude towards the 
Soviet past. She mentions that – as it has been observed by several authors18 – the 
                                                          
17 In-depth interview with a 27-year-old journalist, Tauragė, July 2004, cited by (Ramonaitė, 2006, p. 81) 
18 Degutis, Mindaugas. 2002. Rinkiminio elgesio dinamika Lietuvoje 1992–2001 m. Daktaro disertacija. 
Vilnius: Vilniaus universitetas.;  
Ramonaitė, Ainė. 2003, “The End of the Left-Right Discourse in Lithuania?” in Algimantas Jankauskas 
(ed.) Lithuanian Political Science Yearbook 2002. Vilnius: Institute of International Relations and Political 
Science, Vilnius University 
Ramonaitė, Aine. 2007. Posovietinės Lietuvos politinė anatomija. Vilnius: Versus Aureus 
Ramonaitė, Ainė; Maliukevičius, Nerijus; Degutis, Mindaugas. 2007. Tarp Rytų ir Vakarų: Lietuvos 
visuomenės geokultūrinės nuostatos. Vilnius: Versus aureus. 
Žiliukaitė, Rūta; Ramonaitė, Ainė. 2009. „Vertybinės nuostatos ir rinkėjų balsavimas“ in Ainė Ramonaitė 
(sud.). Partinės demokratijos pabaiga? Politinis atstovavimas ir ideologijos. Vilnius: Versus aureus 
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Soviet/anti-Soviet attitudes allow to predict voting behaviour in Lithuania better than any 
other socioeconomic or attitudinal factor (Ramonaitė, 2013, p. 265). Ramonaitė tested 
three hypotheses using the data of the 2012 post-electoral survey: 1) the assessment of 
the Soviet period is determined by sociodemographic factors: the present social status and 
its change compared to the Soviet period; 2) it is determined by the social environment; 
3) it is decided by value orientation (Ramonaitė, 2013, p. 266). The findings confirm the 
role of all factors, however, to a differing extent19.  
The assessment of the Soviet period is determined not by the current living 
conditions or status, but the change of status – the difference between the (subjectively 
felt) living conditions and the status in the Soviet era and now (Ramonaitė, 2013, p. 271).  
The impact of social environment is connected to the fact whether the family of 
the respondent had suffered from repressions in the Soviet period (Ramonaitė, 2013, p. 
273), whether they have participated in Sąjūdis (Ramonaitė, 2013, p. 265) and the identity 
of the parents of the respondent and the political views of the social environment (friends, 
acquaintances) (Ramonaitė, 2013, p. 278). Value orientation most closely correlates with 
the assessment of the overall benefit of the Soviet period for Lithuania (it reduces the 
likelihood of anti-Soviet position about four times) as well as the support for price 
regulation and the reduction of inequality (Ramonaitė, 2013, p. 281). Other influential 
factors are nationality – being Lithuanian, compared with Russian ethnicity, increases the 
likelihood of anti-Soviet views 2.5 times (the Russian minority feels that they have lost 
the status of the privileged ethnic group) (Ramonaitė, 2013, pp. 272–273) and place of 
residence – being a city dweller increases the likelihood of being anti-Soviet more than 
two times compared to rural inhabitants (Ramonaitė, 2013, p. 274). (It again shows that 
the pro-Soviet/anti-Soviet divide overlaps with the urban-rural divide.) 
It is interesting that this question only differentiates electoral preferences among 
the older generation, as young people often do not have an opinion on this question. 
Ramonaitė explains it with cognitive dissonance: at school and public space a negative 
                                                          
Imbrasaitė, Jūratė; Žilys, Apolonijus; Bartuškaitė, Miglė. 2001. „Sovietinės sistemos vertinimas ir požiūris 
į demokratiją Lietuvoje“, Filosofija, Sociologija 2 (22): 106–114. 
19 In her earlier book ’Between East and West – foundations of geocultural principles’ (2007) Ramonaitė 
noted that Soviet nostalgia first of all depends on how someone evaluates the Soviet system (economic 
effectivity and justness) and the perception of job opportunities in the current system is only on the second 
place. (Ramonaitė, 2007b, p. 21) 
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assessment of the Soviet period is presented while they may hear different views in their 
social environment (Ramonaitė, 2013, p. 283) 
Seeking to illustrate the significance of the pro-Soviet/anti-Soviet attitude for 
voting preferences, Ramonaitė examined the electorate of different parties in the light of 
the question: ’Do you agree that it was better to live during Soviet times?‘. The result, as 
she puts it, mirrors the current party competition: there is a sharp divide between the 
electorate of the right-wing Homeland Union and Liberal Movement on the one hand and 
the LSDP and the ‘newcomer‘ Order and Justice and Labour Party (who now form the 
parliamentary opposition and the governing coalition) on the other: 
 
 
Share of respondents among party supporters who agree that living during Soviet times 
was better20(DP – Labour Party, TT – Order and Justice, LSDP – Social Democratic 
Party of Lithuania, TS-LKD: Homeland Union-Christian Democrats) (Ramonaitė, 2013, 
p. 269) 
 
 In an earlier survey Ramonaitė also found that the biggest part (more than one 
quarter) of those who agree with this statement intended to vote for one of the new parties: 
Labour Party, Lithuanian Popular Peasants’ Union and Order and Justice (Ramonaitė, 
2007a, pp. 100–101). 
It is also worth to mention that while earlier people of pro-Soviet orientation most 
frequently voted for the Democratic Labour Party (predecessor of LSDP/Social 
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Democrats), now the electorate of this party does not stand out with pro-Soviet attitude 
(there are only 2.6 percentage points more voters of LSDP among the pro-Soviet people 
than among the anti-Soviet) (Ramonaitė, 2007a, p. 101). 
 
These findings again reinforce my argument that the newcomer parties orient 
themselves towards those who are disappointed with the current system and feel nostalgia 
for the Soviet period. Although the leader of Order and Justice claimed that attempts to 
associate the party with uneducated rural inhabitants who are disappointed with the state 
power are unfounded (Žiliukaitė and Ramonaitė, 2009, p. 38), there are signs that show 
the opposite.  
It is difficult to find statistics on voting patterns. I analysed the results of the 2012 
Seimas elections21 according to territorial distribution. There are 71 single-member 
constituencies in the whole country, 10 of them in Vilnius and 18 in other bigger cities 
(Kaunas, Klaipėda, Šiauliai, Panevėžys, – over 100 000 inhabitants). So 40% of the 
electoral districts are in bigger cities, however, out of the 10 mandates gained by the 
Labour Party in single-member districts, only 2 are in bigger cities (one from Vilnius and 
one from Klaipėda). Order and Justice did not gain any mandates in bigger cities, all of 
the 5 mandates are from smaller towns and villages, mainly from the West of the country. 
It shows that the electorate of the two parties is mainly based in rural and provincial areas.  
It is in accordance with the popular notion of ‘two Lithuanias’ that claims that the 
country is divided to a flourishing centre and an impoverished province (Ramonaitė, 
2007a, p. 91). This theory became popular after the 2002-2003 presidential elections that 
was – unexpectedly for quite a few people – won by R. Paksas. With his pre-election 
journey across the provinces he wanted to demonstrate that he represents the ‘second 
Lithuania’, forgotten and not appreciated by the elite. This theory was also used to explain 
the success of the Labour Party in the 2004 European Parliament and Seimas elections 
(Ramonaitė, 2007a, p. 90). The analysis conducted by Ramonaitė confirmed that the 
country is indeed divided into ’first Lithuania’ that looks into the future and ’second 
Lithuania’ that feels nostalgia for the Soviet past. The latter makes up about 40 percent 
while the former is only about one third. ’First Lithuania’ votes for rightist parties, mainly 
                                                          
21http://www.vrk.lt/statiniai/puslapiai/2012_seimo_rinkimai/output_lt/rinkimu_diena/isrinkti_seimo_naria
i_kadencijaia.html  
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the Homeland Union, while ’Second Lithuania’ is disappointed with traditional parties 
and chooses new political forces or does not intend to vote at all and the Social 
Democratic Party attracts voters equally from both groups. This cleavage partly overlaps 
with the socioeconomic dimension (incomes) and also with the geographical distribution 
(capital city and province),  (Ramonaitė, 2007a, p. 102).  
However, Ramonaitė notes that the difference between people of pro-Soviet and 
anti-Soviet orientation overshadows the differences in place of residence and income 
(Ramonaitė, 2007a, p. 101). 
 
I tend to agree with Ramonaitė that the view of the Soviet past is the most 
important divide that overlaps with the communist/anti-communist dimension, the 
socioeconomic dimension (winners and losers of transformation) and (because of the 
growing differences in the quality of life between urban and rural areas) also with the 
urban/rural dimension. In this sense, it could be called a ’supercleavage’ that is mirrored 
in the divide between traditional and newcomer (populist) parties that orientate 
themselves towards the losers of the transformation that are naturally receptive towards 
the anti-establishment rhetoric that populists represent. Being a loser of democratic 
transition (subjectively felt deterioration of living conditions) correlates with living in 
rural areas (because of the division between modernising cities and stagnating 
countryside) and with nostalgia towards the Soviet past. All of these factors again 
correlate with distrust towards democratic institutions, anti-establishment and anti-system 
views (as can be seen from the next section) and as a consequence, support for non-
traditional parties, which, being anti-system and anti-elite, try to capitalize on Soviet 
nostalgia.  
 
It is very important from the point of view of this research that attitude towards 
the Soviet past is the most important issue divide that separates the electorate of the 
newcomer, ‘populist’ parties from that of the traditional parties.  
Of course it would be an oversimplification to say that it is synonymous with the 
attitude towards Russia. According to the survey conducted in 200622 and analysed by 
                                                          
22 A survey commissioned by the Civil Society Institute (Pilietinės visuomenės institutas) and conducted 
in October 2006 by public opinion and market research centre Vilmorus. 
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Ainė Ramonaitė, 24% of the respondents evaluated the political arrangement of the SSRS 
positively, however, only 10% of the respondents had a positive opinion about the 
political arrangement of Russia and Belarus. Still there is some connection between the 
two things: among those who assessed the Soviet Union negatively, even 72% had the 
same opinion about Russia and those who assess the Soviet Union positively, tend to 
evaluate today’s Russia’s political system as mediocre or good (Ramonaitė, 2007b, p. 
22). The same can be said about the negative geopolitical perception of Russia: among 
those who disagree that it was better to live during the Soviet period, almost 80% 
identified Russia as Lithuania’s enemy, while it was only 56% among those who feel 
nostalgia for the Soviet times. Ramonaitė explains it with a certain mentality and view of 
Lithuania’s present situation. (Ramonaitė, 2007b, p. 34). (It is also noted that those who 
suffered from Soviet repression have a more hostile view of Russia and Belarus. 
(Ramonaitė, 2007b, p. 35)) Another interesting point is that people with lower incomes 
look at Russia less critically; the author suggests that it may be connected to their negative 
view of parties and politicians who constantly stress the dangers coming from Russia 
(Ramonaitė, 2007b, p. 33). Talking specifically about the electorate of different parties, 
notes that those who are the most sceptical about the West and Lithuania and have the 
most positive assessment of the regimes of Russia and Belarus are the voters of Labour 
Party, followed by the supporters of the Popular Peasants’ Union and Order and Justice 
(in other words, the non-traditional parties) (Ramonaitė, 2007b, p. 36).  Those who have 
the least negative attitude towards Russia are the supporters of Order and Justice 
(Ramonaitė, 2007b, p. 37). The highest share of people who answered that they would 
not be deterred from voting for a party if it turned out that it was supported by Russia was 
among the voters of Labour Party ad Order and Justice (Ramonaitė, 2007b, p. 39). 
(Although it has to be noted that even among the voters of Order and Justice and Labour 
Party there are more people who would rather approve if a party had connections to the 
US, so it would be inaccurate to say that the supporters of these parties are straight-out 
pro-Russian (Ramonaitė, 2007b, pp. 40–42)). Also the voters of these two parties were 
those who sympathized with Russia the most and did not tend to regard it as an enemy 
(Ramonaitė, 2007b, pp. 43–44) The supporters of the Social Democrats, however, are in 
between the Homeland Union and the new parties (Ramonaitė, 2007b, p. 36).  
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Ramonaitė concludes that ‘the civilizational fault line between the pro-Western 
and pro-Eastern orientations exists within Lithuania itself and this dimension, as noted by 
the researchers23 of Lithuania’s party system, is one of the most important dimensions 
that form the structure of the Lithuanian party system and party preferences’ (Ramonaitė, 
2007b, p. 36) and adds that ‘the nostalgia for the Soviet times is alive and, although it 
cannot be equated with pro-Russian geopolitical orientation, it nevertheless works as a 
favourable soil for Russia’s cultural expansion and propaganda’ (Ramonaitė, 2007b, p. 
84).  
But it also has to be stated that for the Lithuanian society, Western European and 
US economic and political and social system is the preferred one and the Russian and 
Belarussian systems are regarded as unacceptable for Lithuania (Ramonaitė, 2007b, p. 
13). It will explain the relative restraint of the parties known as pro-Russian, as voicing 
outright pro-Russian opinions is a taboo that might lead to ostracization and alienate 
voters.  
It is also worth attention that the same parties whose supporters are the most 
nostalgic towards the Soviet past are also accused of representing a pro-Russian position. 
There are a couple of points that seem to support this assumption. 
In the early stage of independence, the pro-Soviet/anti-Soviet or East-West 
geopolitical cleavage manifested as the controversy between the two main political 
forces: the Lithuanian Democratic Labour Party and the successors of the Sąjūdis; at this 
time, the ’pro-Soviet’ orientation consisted of ’favourable mentions of decreasing 
military expenditures, positive attitudes towards former communists’ involvement in the 
transition process and favourable mentions of Russia and the USSR’(Ramonaitė, 2003, 
pp. 29–31). It seems that this cleavage has somewhat transformed over time, but it did 
contain a link to the Russian Federation even in its initial period.  
In a study made in 2009 about the value orientation of Lithuanian parties and 
voters, Ainė Ramonaitė and Rūta Žiliukaitė found that the leadership of Homeland Union 
considers it the least likely to cooperate with parties that they regard as the ’projects of 
Russia’s special services’ while the leader of the Liberal Union ruled out cooperation with 
the so-called populist parties that are influenced from Russia, such as Order and Justice 
                                                          
23 Jurkynas, M., 2001. Politinio konflikto kaita ir takoskyros, in: Lietuva Po Seimo Rinkimų 2000. Naujasis 
lankas, Vilnius, Kaunas. (Ramonaitė, 2007a, pp. 23–33) 
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and Labour Party (Žiliukaitė and Ramonaitė, 2009, pp. 31–32). This suggests that the pro-
Soviet/anti-Soviet cleavage persisted as the controversy between those who support and 
oppose influence from the Eastern neighbour. In the same time, it has interwoven with 
the opposition of traditional and populist parties ‘that could be classified as a value-based 
cleavage if it would become clear that the orientation of the parties associated with Russia 
is indeed more pro-Russian than that of their opponents’ (Žiliukaitė and Ramonaitė, 2009, 
p. 32).  
The research on the most important values of Lithuanian political parties has 
confirmed that the politicians of Order and Justice are the most pro-Russian (especially 
in questions of cooperation with Russia and the question of former KGB collaborators) – 
although there is high variation of opinions among the party members – followed by the 
Labour Party (Žiliukaitė and Ramonaitė, 2009, p. 49). The analysis of the principles of 
party members confirm rather the pro-Russian image of the party than the patriotic social 
conservative identity formulated by its leader (Žiliukaitė and Ramonaitė, 2009, p. 52). 
In accordance with the idea of East-West civilizational fault line within the 
country that has been raised by Ramonaitė, I propose the following explanation for the 
link between pro-Soviet and pro-Russian views. Lithuania has always been on the border 
of Western civilization and Russia that had various political systems in different periods 
(Russian Empire, Soviet Union, Russian Federation), but from a geopolitical point of 
view, the situation was similar: either to belong to the West or to the Russian sphere of 
influence. So a simplified view does not concentrate on the differences between today’s 
Russia and the Soviet Union. Apart from that, Putin’s Russia sometimes also uses Soviet 
nostalgia as part of its foreign policy: for example, the use of Saint George ribbons or 
Putin’s famous quote that the fall of the Soviet Union was a major geopolitical disaster 
of the 20th century. Furthermore, saying that life was better during the Soviet period 
presupposes dissatisfaction with the current, Western-style democratic political system 
and membership in the ‘other Union’, the European Union. Then bearing in mind 
Lithuania’s special geopolitical situation, it is an obvious attitude for these people to – 
perhaps sometimes as a protest attitude – prefer that ‘other pole’, the power that is the 
most easily identifiable with the Soviet Union: Russia. One way of trying to capitalize on 
Soviet nostalgia could be to promote Eurosceptic, pro-Russian views. As Labour Party 
and Order and Justice have a pro-Russian reputation, the research will try to clarify 
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whether the parties indeed use pro-Russian views as part of a populist rhetoric to gain 
support from this part of the electorate.  
 
 
2.2. Populism in Lithuania and the Perception of Populist Parties 
 
 
2.2.1 Features of the electoral system promoting the spread of populism 
 
 There are some peculiarities of the Lithuanian party system and voting 
behaviour that are connected to cleavages and correlate with the success of populist 
parties. 
 
The population is quite passive politically regarding voting turnout and party 
membership. This may signal disappointment with politics in general that also manifests 
in distrust towards democratic institutions and political parties. The latter also manifests 
in high electoral volatility. High volatility means that voters are constantly dissatisfied 
and looking for new alternatives, either in terms of new parties or new, attractive elements 
that entice them to abandon their preferences and vote for another party. This promotes 
the rise of new parties that have a populist, anti-elite, anti-establishment rhetoric, perhaps 
linked with irresponsible promises. 
 
After 1992, voter turnout has stabilized at a low level, and at the last three 
parliamentary elections was fairly low, around 45-50% (2004: 46.1%; 2008:48.59%; 
2012: 52.93%)24.  
 
Party membership is at a low level in Lithuania compared with other Central and 
Eastern European countries (Ramonaitė, 2006, p. 82) However, Krupavičius noted in 
2005 that party size and party membership were increasing slowly, and there were some 
large parties, such as the Homeland Union−Christian Democrats and the Lithuanian 
Social Democratic Party (Krupavičius, 2005b, p. 131). Tõnis Saarts concluded in 2011 
                                                          
24 Lithuanian Election Committee, http://www.vrk.lt/pagal-rusi  
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that ‘Lithuanian and particularly Latvian party systems were characterised by quite 
remarkable instability and feeble roots in the societies’ (Saarts, 2011, p. 99) 
 
Voter volatility is at a much higher level than in Western Europe (Krupavičius, 
2005b, p. 134). It was already apparent to some extent in the 1990s: ‘After the first 
multiparty elections in 1992, new protest, populist and single-issue parties tended to enter 
the political scene very regularly on the eve of every new election and sometimes to 
disappear almost the next day after the election’ (Krupavičius, 2005a, p. 192). Although 
in the 1990s the Lithuanian party system was considered more stable than the Latvian and 
Estonian one, there was still considerable volatility that manifested as the fluctuation of 
votes between the two major parties: the Homeland Union and the Social Democrats. 
(Jurkynas, 2004; Krupavičius, 2005a; Novagrockienė 2001; Ramonaite, 2006).’ (Saarts, 
2011, p. 88) 
However, the rise of volatility was especially apparent after the ‘earthquake 
elections’ in 2000 when several new parties entered the political scene (Saarts, 2011, p. 
88). ‘The volatility rate in Lithuania has increased with every election and in 2004 it was 
above 50, while the average volatility rate in East Central and Eastern Europe is about 
30.’ (Ramonaitė, 2006, p. 83) Ramonaitė also notes that the combined share of seats of 
the two main parties, the Social Democrats and the Homeland Union has decreased from 
72% in 1992 to 32% in 2004 and the number of parties with substantive parliamentary 
representation has increased from 5 to 7 (Ramonaitė, 2006, p. 84). She sees the reason in 
the distrust for political parties and political elite and in the decline of the main, 
communist/anti-communist cleavage that opened up the electoral market for new parties 
(Ramonaitė, 2006, p. 84). In 2011, Saarts noted that ‘[t]he fragmentation in Lithuania has 
increased by a large extent since 1992, and the scores reached their maximum level in the 
last elections’ (Saarts, 2011, p. 90) and concluded that the Lithuanian party system ‘was 
fairly consolidated in the 1990s, but fell into disarray in the next decade.’ (Saarts, 2011, 
p. 90) He characterizes it as an ‘extreme multiparty system with one dominant party’ 
(Saarts, 2011, p. 91).  
 
  Low turnout and party membership and high volatility can all be explained by the 
distrust towards the parties and the general scepticism and lack of trust towards 
36 
 
democratic institutions (Novagrockienė, 2001, pp. 151–152). As Algis Krupavičius notes, 
political parties are usually among the most distrusted institutions across Baltic countries’ 
(Krupavičius, 2005b, p. 134) About 10 years after the regime change, there was 
substantial amount of distrust towards the political elite and the multiparty system: 
according to a poll made in 2001 in European post-communist countries, 44% of 
respondents in Lithuania would have agreed to close the parliament and ban all political 
parties, occupying the first place in the region (the values ranged from 12% to 44% with 
an average 28-29% (Veidas, 11 March 2004:32. , cited by  (Palubinskas, 2005)). Between 
2004 and 2010, the trust in parties in Lithuania was only 9% on average (Saarts, 2011, p. 
92). 
 
 The distrust towards parties and democratic institutions is important from our 
point of view, as being disappointed with the political system increases the likelihood of 
voting for anti-system, anti-establishment, in other words, populist parties. Being 
sceptical about Western-style democratic institutions probably correlates with 
Euroscepticism and can be related to being more pro-Russian (as the choice of 
geopolitical orientations in the case of Lithuania is quite limited).  
 
 It is also important to pay attention how the party system destabilized after the 
2000 and especially after the 2004 elections, giving space for several new parties. This 
process, of course, can also be linked to the general distrust towards traditional parties 
and anti-elite sentiments. The weakness of the traditional mainstream parties (Homeland 
Union and Social Democrats) as well as the competition between an increased number of 
parties could have also contributed to the spread of populist rhetoric (Balcere, 2011, pp. 
15–16). This transformation was connected to the decline of the communist/anti-
communist cleavage (Ramonaitė, 2006, p. 84) as the traditional mainstream parties based 
their popularity on this cleavage. 
 
 Ainė Ramonaitė divides the development of Lithuanian party system into two 
stages: ’(1) formation of the party system in 1989-1998, and (2) destabilization of the 
party system, apparent since 2000’(Ramonaitė, 2006, p. 70).  
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On the historical level, parties that had some history reaching the pre-Soviet era 
(the Social Democrats and the Christian Democrats) were more significant in the initial 
period after the transition, but their political weight and representation decreased after the 
2000 Seimas elections (Krupavičius, 2005a, p. 184). (It has to be noted that the LSDP is 
only ‘half-historical’, as it later merged with the Lithuanian Democratic Labour Party, the 
successor of the Lithuanian Communist Party.) 
 
Until the 2000 elections, Lithuanian politics was characterised by bipolar 
fluctuation of the two main left- and right-wing parties, the Lithuanian Democratic 
Labour Party (parliamentary majority in 1992) and the Homeland Union/Lithuanian 
Conservatives (parliamentary majority in 1996) (Krupavičius, 2005b, p. 133). Compared 
with the other two Baltic states, the average share of new parties since the first elections 
has been lower in Lithuania because of the strength of the two large mainstream parties. 
However, with the elections in 2000, two new parties (the Liberal Union and the New 
Union-Social Liberals, the latter later merged with the Labour Party) entered the system25. 
After the 2000 elections, the Seimas was dominated by a center-left majority, which failed 
to form a government immediately after the election (Krupavičius, 2005b, p. 133). 
 
The elections in 2000 are regarded as an important watershed in the development 
of the Lithuanian party system: the established right-wing parties of the Homeland 
Union/Lithuanian Conservatives, the Christian Democrats and the Lithuanian Centre 
Union have lost positions (the latter two even failed to cross the threshold) to the 
newcomer Liberal Union and New Union-Social Liberals who together gained more than 
24% of the votes and more than one fifth of the seats (Krupavičius, 2005a, p. 191). 
According to Algis Krupavičius, it signalled the crisis of the established centre-right 
parties (Homeland Union/Christian Democrats and Centre Alliance) and was caused by 
their poor performance at government (Krupavičius, 2005a, p. 191). Ainė Ramonaitė 
attributes the failure of the earlier governing Homeland Union to the Mažeikių nafta 
privatization fiasco, the economic depression of 1999 and the internal splits within the 
party (Ramonaitė, 2006, p. 72). On the other hand, she explains the success of the new 
                                                          
25 Actually, The Liberal Union, winning only one seat at the previous elections became the largest party 
in Seimas with 34 seats.  
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parties with the popularity of their charismatic leaders, Artūras Paulauskas and Rolandas 
Paksas (Ramonaitė, 2006, p. 73) (Paulauskas lost the presidential elections of 1997/1998 
as a non-party candidate to Valdas Adamkus by only 1%, while Paksas was well known 
as the former mayor of Vilnius and former prime minister of the Conservative government 
(Ramonaitė, 2006, p. 73).  
However, as Ainė Ramonaitė notes (Ramonaitė, 2006, p. 70), it was only the 
beginning of the ’decay’ of the ”traditional parties”. At the elections in 2004, three new 
parties (Labour Party, Order and Justice – Liberal Democratic Party and the Union of 
Peasants and New Democracy) managed to acquire seats in the parliament winning 46% 
of the votes and 42% of the seats (Ramonaitė, 2006, p. 74), among them the Labour Party, 
established only a year before, coming on the first place with 28%. The Labour Party also 
gained 30% of the Lithuanian votes at the EP elections in June the same year (Ramonaitė, 
2006, p. 70). Since then, ‘the ex-communist and ex-Sąjūdis parties have lost their 
dominant positions, party system fragmentation is increasing and electoral volatility is 
growing with every election’ (Ramonaitė, 2006, p. 70). This trend was apparent during 
the 2008 and 2012 elections with 10 and 8 parties gaining mandates26 and the most 
successful party (Homeland Union/Christian Democrats and Labour Party respectively) 
acquiring only 19% of the votes and new parties gaining representation in the Seimas: 
National Resurrection Party established in 2008 and The Way of Courage established in 
2012. The former was headed by Arūnas Valinskas, a performer and producer and there 
were numerous artists and celebrities among the members that is why it was renowned as 
a ‘clown party’ (“Valinskas: pas mus sąrašuose nėra juokdarių ir klounų,” 2011). The 
Way of Courage is a single-issue party concentrated on the fight against paedophilia, 
inspired by a recent criminal case. The success of these two parties can also be interpreted 
as a sign of disappointment among the voters and a turn towards non-standard, anti-
establishment (perhaps populist) political parties.  
 
 From our point of view, it is also worth to mention the geopolitical orientation of 
the main parties. Basically, being manifestly anti-Western is not an alternative in today’s 
                                                          
26 
http://www.vrk.lt/statiniai/puslapiai/2008_seimo_rinkimai/output_lt/rinkimu_diena/isrinkti_seimo_nariai
_kadencijaik.html 
http://www.vrk.lt/statiniai/puslapiai/2012_seimo_rinkimai/output_lt/rinkimu_diena/isrinkti_seimo_nariai
_kadencijaik.html  
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politics, so even those parties that are Eurosceptic (like Order and Justice) have to serve 
it in such a form that is acceptable in the Lithuanian political atmosphere.  
The Homeland Union ‘distinguishes itself by its anti-communist and anti-Russian 
rhetoric’ (Ramonaitė, 2006, p. 75) and resembles Western-style right-wing parties in 
emphasising such values as nation, family and religion’ (Ramonaitė, 2006, p. 75). The 
party’s pro-Western position is also important from our point of view, as it was the 
strongest advocate of NATO and EU accession (Ramonaitė, 2006, p. 75). In the middle 
of 2000s, the party was seen as ‘one of the most liberal parties in Lithuania in terms of 
economic policy’ (Ramonaitė, 2006, p. 75). It is a member of the European People’s 
Party.  
The Social Democrats (LSDP) merged with the Democratic Labour Party, the 
successor of the communist party, but it takes a firm pro-Western and pro-EU stance and 
is a member of the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats.  
The Liberal Movement is also firmly pro-Western, member of the Alliance of 
Liberals and Democrats for Europe.  
 
 
2.2.2 The Perception of Populism in Lithuania 
 
In this section I am trying to provide some insight on how populism is perceived 
in Lithuania, which parties are usually regarded and labelled populist and why they are 
accused of being pro-Russian.  
 
One interesting take on populism in Lithuania is Rasa Baločkaitė’s attempt 
(Baločkaitė, 2007) to apply Mircea Eliade’s idea of eternal return and ethnomethodology 
to understand people’s approach to politics in the country. According to Eliade’s idea, the 
primitive consciousness does not think in terms of history, but the cyclical return of 
archetypes to make sense of the world. Baločkaitė argues that in Lithuania the archetype 
of ’evil power’ has formed through the centuries: power is always evil and works against 
the people – hence the distrust towards parties and the parliament. According to this 
archetypical view, power is strictly separated from the people: power is referred to as 
‘they’ and all politicians are thought to be the same (evil), without individual 
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characteristics. Baločkaitė notes that some politicians make use of this worldview, among 
them Rolandas Paksas and Viktor Uspaskich (the leaders of Order and Justice and Labour 
Party). As a president, Paksas tried to picture himself as the ’saviour of the ordinary 
people’ (and the ’victim of the system’) and was manipulating with the archetype of the 
’evil power’. Uspaskich’s party won the elections of 2004 with unrealistic promises to 
raise salaries and reduce prices for heating; it implies that these things are easy to do and 
it is only the ’evil power’ that prevents people from having a good standard of living.  
 
 There is little scholarly literature available on populist parties in Lithuania. In 
everyday political discourse, it is common to refer to ‘populist parties’. However, it is 
more difficult to establish on the basis of exact criteria which parties can be indeed 
considered populist. 
 
In her article about populist parties in the Baltic states, Ieva Balcere notes there 
that almost all the parties in these three countries include some aspects of populism, and 
populism is ’especially widespread in Lithuania’ (Balcere, 2011, p. 1): ’almost every 
political party indicates at least one populist-related characteristic where the most 
widespread is anti-establishment stance, particularly using the notion of corruption. The 
antagonism towards political elites is not marginal but systemic. Political parties in the 
Baltics widely use the notion that mainstream political elite is corrupted and systemic 
corruption is deep rooted in political system as a whole. Reduction of corruption as one 
of the objectives is stated in almost all party programmes.’ (Balcere, 2011, p. 8) Balcere 
uses characteristics based on the definition of de Raadt et el. (2004) of populism as a 
’lowest common denominator’ for parties to classify as populist: centrality of people, 
direct democracy, anti-establishment (anti-elite) stance (Balcere, 2011, p. 4). Applying 
these criteria, Balcere analyses the electoral programmes of parties. According to these 
criteria, she classifies Order and Justice and the Liberal Movement of Lithuania as 
populist, while Labour Party does not fulfil the anti-establishment (anti-elite) criteria.  
 She characterizes the position of Order and Justice as very critical towards the 
current state of affairs (anti-establishment rhetoric) and identifying itself with the 
electorate (appeal to the people) as well as using conspiracy theories, ‘meaning that 
political elite functions as a sort of puppet in hands of foreign forces’ (anti-elite rhetoric) 
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(Balcere, 2011, p. 5). The centrality of people is also emphasized in their programme. 
The party also stresses the involvement of people in political decisions (before leaving 
the post of the president, in his farewell speech to the people Paksas also expressed his 
aspiration to achieve that the president, elected by the people had more power and not 
only a representative function27). When comparing it with Western European populist 
parties, Balcere notes that Order and Justice does not express an anti-EU stance in its 
election programme, quite on the contrary (Balcere, 2011, p. 12). The party tries to create 
some kind of conspiracy theory, but it does not identify clearly foreign actors it mentions 
(foreign intelligence services, ‘powerful world forces’) (Balcere, 2011, p. 12). The only 
characteristic of OJ that reminds Western European populist parties is the emphasis on 
law and order (Balcere, 2011, p. 13) and that Paksas is ‘well known for his populist 
rhetoric’ (Balcere, 2011, p. 14).  
 Balcere suggests that the reason why populism is more characteristic for the 
Lithuanian political scene in general is the fierce competition between a high number of 
political parties, by competition serving as a catalyst that forces parties ‘to employ direct 
and simplified rhetoric in order to gather the necessary attention from potential voters’ 
(Balcere, 2011, pp. 15–16). 
  
 As we can see, Balcere concluded that one of the two most prominent parties 
usually labelled as populist does correspond to all the criteria of populism, while the other 
does not. However, considering that – according to Balcere – populism is generally 
prevalent among Lithuanian parties and that Labour Party does correspond to two criteria 
out of three, moreover, it is widely perceived as populist, it will be labelled a populist 
party in this research, bearing in mind that as a party that is represented in a governing 
coalition already for the second time, it may be in a process of transformation and 
becoming more ‘mainstream’.  
 
 In a research report about populism in the Baltic states, the authors also observed 
populist elements in the manifesto’s of practically all the parties that ran in the 2008 
elections, but Order and Justice was characterised as a more radical one among the 
parliamentary parties (Balcere et al., 2012, p. 41).  
                                                          
27 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1UfP5giygKM retrieved on 16.04.2016 
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On the other hand, it is not the populist ‘label’ that matters from the point of view 
of this research, but what I would like to explore is whether they base their strategy on 
societal cleavages and whether advocating pro-Russian/Eurosceptic stance is connected 
to such cleavages, especially the pro-Soviet/anti-Soviet one. From this aspect, the Labour 
Party and Order and Justice are probably the most suitable parties to examine, because of 
their widespread image of being in some ways connected to Russia.  
 
Below I am attempting to illustrate what events could have contributed to these 
parties being perceived as pro-Russian. (Uspaskich is not the leader of the party any more, 
but being the founder of Labour Party, his personality is still strongly associated with it.) 
  
Rolandas Paksas became famous as president removed from his post by an 
impeachment procedure. Already during his electoral campaign, he was suspected to have 
financial and intellectual support from Russia (Ramonaitė, 2006, p. 74) (through the 
Russian company Almax) (Norkus, 2011, p. 26). After his victory at the presidential 
election, in the end of 2003, Paksas was accused of illegally granting citizenship to a 
Russian businessman who financed his electoral campaign and passing on secret 
information to him (that the National Security Service was bugging his telephone line) by 
breaking his presidential oath as well as promoting the financial interests of people close 
to him by misusing his office. Consequently, he was removed by an impeachment 
procedure and barred for lifetime from any public office that requires taking an oath 
according to the Constitutional Court28. However, later Paksas attacked this sentence at 
the European Court of Human Rights that condemned the action of the Lithuanian state 
as unproportioned (Urmonaitė, 2011). He was the first president in Europe to be removed 
by such procedure (Nikitenka, 2004). (After Paksas’ appeal to the Lithuanian Supreme 
                                                          
28 ’Paksas wanted to run in the presidential elections to replace himself. Since this defied logic, Parliament 
amended the election law on May 4, prohibiting an impeached individual from running for the presidency 
for five years following his removal from office. Paksas supporters in Parliament appealed to the 
Constitutional Court to rule on the constitutionality of the amendment. The Constitutional Court agreed to 
take the matter under review. On May 25, the Constitutional Court ruled that the amendment was 
unconstitutional and stated unequivocally that individuals impeached for gravely breaching Lithuania’s 
constitution or for breaking their oath of office could never again run for the presidency, nor could they 
hold any other office that required them to swear an oath to the nation since they had already proven 
incapable of honoring it.’. (Palubinskas, 2005) 
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Court, it ruled that he was not guilty of revealing state secrets to Y. Borisov in the lack of 
proofs, but the Court of Appeals decided that the acquit was made due to the insufficient 
linking of separate parts of evidence and concluded that Paksas committed a criminal act 
(Roudik, 2015).)  
 
The founder and former leader of Labour Party, Viktor Uspaskich is himself of 
Russian origin, he settled in Lithuania in 1985. After the victory of his party at the 2004 
elections, he was appointed minister of economy in the cabinet of Algirdas Brazauskas, 
but resigned because of the financial scandal in his party. He was accused of faulty 
bookkeeping (tax evasion), subsequently escaped to Russia and asked for political 
asylum. In 2007, he organised a press conference in Moscow with the title Violation of 
human and civil rights in Europe – attempts to kidnap and kill MP candidate Viktor 
Uspaskich, claiming that he is persecuted by the Lithuanian authorities on political 
grounds and the country is turning into dictatorship (“Виктора Успасских взяли под 
арест,” 2007). Lithuanian president Valdas Adamkus condemned Uspaskich’s actions 
and especially the fact that he is using Russia as a safe haven (“Adamkų stebina 
„darbiečių“ veržimasis pas besislapstantį Uspaskichą,” 2007). There were reports that the 
State Security Office (VSD) was investigating suspicions that Labour Party is financed 
from offshore companies, connected to Russian secret services (“Uspaskichas ramus kaip 
Paksas,” 2008). There were also rumours that Uspaskich participated in a private meeting 
where the representative of Gazprom in Lithuania agreed on a deal to appoint Gediminas 
Kirkilas as the next prime minister, instead of another candidate (“Uspaskichas ramus 
kaip Paksas,” 2008).  
 
 
2.3. The Party Profiles of Labour Party and Order and Justice 
 
In this section, I am trying to draw the profiles of the two most significant 
‘newcomer’ or non-traditional parties represented in the parliament currently, the Labour 
Party and the Order and Justice party. It should give a general idea of how the two parties 
are rooted in the Lithuanian party system.  
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Both parties were regarded as being built upon the popularity of their leaders, 
Viktor Uspaskich and Rolandas Paksas.  
 
Order and Justice 
 
According to his biography29 published on the website of his party, Rolandas 
Paksas (1956- ) was originally a construction engineer, stunt pilot and businessman. He 
was member of the Communist Party before 1989 and member of the Democratic Labour 
Party between 1989 and 1995. In 1997, he became the mayor of Vilnius. In 1999, he was 
the prime minister of the Conservative government. In the same year, he was elected 
chairman of the Liberal Union of Lithuania and member of parliament, Meanwhile, he 
became the mayor of Vilnius again. In 2000 and 2001, for about eight months, he was 
prime minister again in the coalition government of the Liberal Union and the New 
Union-Social Liberals. In 2002, he created the Liberal Democratic Party which was in 
2006 renamed Order and Justice. In 2014, he was elected to the European parliament 
where he is the chairman of the Eurosceptic group ‘Europe of Freedom and Democracy’.  
The former party of Paksas, the Liberal Union was oriented towards liberal 
ideology while the Liberal Democratic Party ‘did not have an explicit ideological 
orientation and mainly appealed to those dissatisfied with the reforms‘(Ramonaitė, 2006, 
p. 73) and ‘mainly attracted the support of an uneducated rural population and ethnic 
minorities, i.e. the traditional electorate of the Labour Democrats. The Liberal Union, in 
contrast, drew most of its support from the Homeland Union‘(Ramonaitė, 2006, p. 73). 
The Liberal Union and the New Union formed a government together with the Lithuanian 
Centre Union and the Modern Christian Democratic Union in 2000 that was after less 
than one year followed by a government led by the Social Democrat Algirdas Brazauskas. 
Paksas later seceded from the Liberal Union and in 2002 formed his own party, the 
Liberal Democratic Party that was later renamed Order and Justice. 
Paksas was elected president in 2003. According to Ramonaitė, he ’ran an 
aggressive and populist electoral campaign with financial and intellectual support from 
Russia’ (Ramonaitė, 2006, p. 74). As Ginta T. Palubinskas notes, ‘Paksas campaign made 
unrealistic promises, such as raising pensions, that won him broad popular support, but 
                                                          
29 http://www.tvarka.lt/lt/pirmininkas/biografija  
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which in reality were impossible to fulfil because they fell outside of the president’s 
constitutional powers’ (Palubinskas, 2005). Paksas campaigned vigorously in the 
countryside, while his opponent’s, Adamkus’ campaign was concentrated on Vilnius 
Palubinskas, 2005). Paksas’ election was also important because it revealed the 
opposition of traditional parties and the challenger of the establishment: in the second 
round of the presidential election, Adamkus was supported by all traditional parties, 
including the Social Democrats, differently than in the 1993 and 1998 presidential 
elections when the competition was between the left and the right candidates (Jankauskas, 
2003, p. 22). 
Accordig to Saulius Šiliauskas, already at the time of his removal procedure, 
Paksas was trying to orientate towards people who are dissatisfied with their social status, 
feel wronged and believe that the system is to blame for all this (Nikitenka, 2004). In the 
same time, historian and politician Vygantas Vareikis noted that the electorate of Paksas 
would likely split between him and Viktor Uspaskich, as the voters supporting populists 
are prone to switch from one candidate to the other (Nikitenka, 2004). Zenonas Norkus 
also thinks that the votes that were previously cast to Paksas’ party were collected by the 
newcomer Labour Party (Norkus, 2011, pp. 23–24) that was not less suspected with 
connections with Moscow(Norkus, 2011, pp. 31–32).    
According to Zenonas Norkus, Paksas’ party represents right-wing populism, 
while the Labour Party – left-wing populism and his impeachment procedure 
consolidated the pact of the post-communist and anti-post-communist elites and  
prevented right-wing populism to gain ground (what happened later in Poland and 
Hungary in case of the governments of the Kaczyński-brothers and Viktor Orbán) but 
strengthened left-wing populism (Uspaskich) (Norkus, 2011, pp. 8–9). Norkus writes that 
all of Paksas’ opponents agree that he was a populist whose rhetoric and symbols were 
much more similar to far-right populists Jörg Haider and Jean-Marie Le Pen than Hugo 
Chavez, Aleksandr Lukashenko or other left-wing populists (Norkus, 2011, pp. 18–19). 
According to Paksas, the most important values for his party are ‘the ideal of a 
strong, independent state, the protection of national values and anti-cosmopolitan 
orientation’(Žiliukaitė and Ramonaitė, 2009, p. 33). He enumerated the following 
features of the identity of his party: independence, moral rebirth, national interests, 
anticosmopolitanism, strong Church, order, justice, leadership of the state (Žiliukaitė and 
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Ramonaitė, 2009, p. 35). Žiliukaitė and Ramonaitė also add that ’on the basis of these 
goals as well as moral rebirth, the emphasis on the strong connection between Church and 
state, this party corresponds the features of the „Christian-nationalist-authoritarian” camp 
indicated by Kitschelt (1995) that balances between liberal and populist economic ideas 
but  stands out with its social traditionalism’(Žiliukaitė and Ramonaitė, 2009, p. 34)  
The party positions itself as a center-right, but is regarded more right-wing.  
During the 2012 elections, the party received 8% of the votes (12 seats). In the 
governing coalition (Social Democrats, Labour Party, Polish Electoral Action) they 
received the interior (until 2014) and environmental affairs (from 2014) portfolios.  
 
Labour Party 
 
The former head of the Labour Party, Viktor Uspaskich (1959- )30 is of Russian 
origin, he was born in the Archangelsk district of the Russian SSR. He arrived for the first 
time to Lithuania in 1985 where he was working in the provincial town of Kėdainiai as a 
welder. Later he created several businesses, connected to the food industry. (His best 
known products are pickled cucumbers, hence his nickname ’Agurkichas’.) In 1991, he 
gained Lithuanian citizenship. In 1993, he acquired a bachelor degree in economics from 
the Plekhanov Academy in Moscow (now Plekhanov Russian University of Economics), 
in 1999 a master’s degree from Kaunas Technical University (currently he is allegedly a 
PhD student at the same university (?)). In 2000, he was elected to the Seimas from the 
Kėdainiai district and became chairman of the economic committee. He established the 
Labour Party in 2003 that gained the most mandates in the elections next year. In 2004 
he was appointed minister of economy in the cabinet of Algirdas Brazauskas, but resigned 
because of the financial scandal in his party. Subsequently he fled Russia and was hiding 
there. He returned to Lithuania in 2007 and was a MEP between 2009 and 2012. In 2012, 
he was again elected to the Seimas and is currently the leader of the faction of Labour 
Party.  In 2013, he was sentenced to four years of prison (Jančys, 2013) but used his 
immunity as an MEP to avoid serving the sentence (Rapporteur: Evelyn Regner, 2015); 
(“Generalinis prokuroras antrą kartą dėl V.Uspaskicho imuniteto nesikreips,” 2013). In 
2014, being elected to the EP again, he rejected his mandate as a member of Seimas.  
                                                          
30 The source of Uspaskich’s biographical data: http://www.uspaskich.eu/apie-mane/  
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The Labour Party is characterised by Ramonaitė as follows: ’The Labour Party 
was created from scratch on the basis of the popularity of its leader Viktor Uspasckich. It 
is a populist party without any ideological orientation31 rather than the Social Democratic 
party that the name of the party would suggest. In its manifesto, it presents itself as a party 
of ‘centrist’ orientation seeking economic prosperity, effective performance of the 
government and the development of the middle class. Despite its anti-establishment 
rhetoric, the party willingly joined a coalition with the Social Democrats after the 2004 
elections, retreating from its ambitious socio-economic goals and calls for radical reforms 
of the governing system’ (Ramonaitė, 2006, p. 76).  
Uspaskich enumerated the following features of the identity of his party: 
pragmatism, liber-labor ideology, pragmatic view of the Soviet period  and ties to Russia, 
populism (Žiliukaitė and Ramonaitė, 2009, p. 35). (The leadership did not disclaim being 
populist.) 
It is important to note that while the Labour Party gained the most votes during 
the 2004 elections, other parties were reluctant to make coalition with them because of 
the personality of Uspaskich (Ramonaitė, 2006, p. 74), but they eventually formed a 
government with the Social Democrats, the New Alliance and the Peasants and New 
Democracy Party Union. The party received the portfolios of economy, interior, justice, 
culture and healthcare.  
 The government where the Labour Party was present came to a crisis in 2006 
because of the corruption scandal of Viktor Uspaskich. The new government formed in 
2006 did not contain the Labour Party, it was formed from LSDP, Liberal and Centre 
Union, Lithuanian Popular Peasants’ Union and the Civic Democratic Party32.   
 In 2011, the New Alliance led by Artūras Paulauskas joined Labour Party, 
Paulauskas became vice-president. In 2013, Labour Party fused the centre-right Christian 
Party33. 
 During the 2012 elections, the party received 21% of the votes (29 seats). After 
the elections, the Social Democrats formed the governing coalition together with the 
Labour Party, the Order and Justice and the Polish Electoral Action. They received the 
                                                          
31 The lack of ideology is consistent with the idea of Stanley (2008) that populism is a ’thin ideology’, not 
an ideology on its own, but something that substitutes an ideology.  
32 http://parties-and-elections.eu/lithuania1.html  
33 http://www.darbopartija.lt/naujienos/partijos-naujienos/susijungusi-su-krikscioniu-partija-darbo-partija-
tapo-didziausia-politine-jega-lietuvoje/  
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portfolios of environment (until 2014), culture, social security and employment, 
education and science, (from 2014 energy policy) and agriculture. 
 In 2015, Labour Party had the most members among Lithuanian parties (22 681)34. 
 
Uspaskich was the chairman of Labour Party since 2003 with smaller pauses 
(2006-2007, 2013-2015). Since May 2015, the head of the party is Valentinas 
Mazuronis35, who was, interestingly, the chairman of the Liberal Democratic Party 
between 2003 and 2004 (before and after Paksas).  
In 2004, the party joined the pro-European European Democratic Party in the 
European Parliament and in 2012 they joined the faction of the European Liberal 
Democrat and Reform Party that has formed a joint group together with EDP.  
According to Uspaskich, the party was organized using the structure borrowed 
from the US Republican Party36. It also has a youth organization called Darbas (Labour)37 
 
One can conclude that both parties have taken firm roots in Lithuanian political 
life as well as in the European Parliament. While the Labour Party strives to portray itself 
as a centrist or social democratic party, the Order and Justice is more oriented towards 
the right but they both lack an explicit ideological orientation. They have gained their 
populist image from their unrealistic promises made during election campaigns and anti-
establishment rhetoric (with Labour Party being now perhaps more consolidated and 
closer to mainstream). Both parties went through scandals that undermined their 
reputation and earned them the pro-Russian label. 
Both parties base their electoral success on groups that feel positively about the 
Soviet past and mainly on inhabitants of rural areas. Based on studies on electoral 
cleavages in Lithuania, it can be concluded that these groups largely overlap with groups 
that consider themselves the losers of democratic transformation and as such, are naturally 
receptive to anti-elite, anti-establishment, and, as a consequence, perhaps also to 
Eurosceptic, anti-Western and pro-Russian rhetoric. 
                                                          
34 http://www.darbopartija.lt/naujienos/partijos-naujienos/darbo-partija-pagal-nariu-skaiciu-pirmoje-
vietoje/  
35 http://www.darbopartija.lt/naujienos/partijos-naujienos/darbo-partijos-taryba-prieme-v.-mazuroni-i-
partija-nutare-del-rinkimu-bei-ministru-darbo/  
36 http://www.darbopartija.lt/naujienos/partijos-naujienos/pavadinimas-1912/  
37 http://www.darbopartija.lt/naujienos/partijos-naujienos/pavadinimas-1912/  
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CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY 
 
 
3.1. Object of Analysis 
3.2. Methods of Analysis 
  3.2.1 Content Analysis 
  3.2.2 Coding 
3.3. Problems and Limitations 
  
 
 This chapter presents the material analysed in order to answer the research 
questions and the methods used for carrying out the analysis. The first section outlines 
the goals of the analysis and the corpus of texts that are going to be analysed in the next 
chapter: on the basis of what criteria the texts were selected and why they are suitable for 
the analysis. The second section introduces content analysis method and the coding 
scheme and the categories applied while the last section draws attention to the problems 
and limitations of the research.  
  
 
3.1. Object of Analysis 
 
The aim of the research is to explore the role of Labour Party and Order and Justice 
in the geopolitical discourse in Lithuania.  
The research questions that will be asked:  
1) how Labour Party and Order and Justice position themselves between Russia 
and the West; 
2)  how do they understand Lithuania’s place in the world; 
3) what are the ideas they represent in terms of the Western world (EU) vs Russia? 
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4) do they use societal cleavages to support their argumentation and gain support? 
 
To do this, an analysis of official documents of the parties may not be sufficient. 
Official documents transfer a fixed, clear-out picture that may not always be consistent 
with the utterances of the politicians. These programmes usually pay too little attention 
to foreign policy and only contain general phrases instead of specific details. Also, when 
formulating official documents, parties can choose what topics to comment on and what 
to neglect. In real-life political discourse, politicians are often forced to take a stance on 
delicate matters and risk that they may estrange supporters, but they also have the chance 
to attract new ones. On the other hand, presumably most voters do not read official 
programmes, they rather concentrate on the stance of parties on specific matters.    
Therefore what is needed is a material (collection of texts) that mirrors real life 
political discourse and that may have an impact on the constituency. Parliamentary 
debates, in my opinion, fulfil both requirements. Another advantage of the analysis of 
parliamentary sessions is that – compared with newspaper reports and interviews – they 
avoid possible distortion by journalists thanks to stenographic recording. The fact that 
parliamentary debates are usually combined with voting also gives the opportunity to 
contrast the rhetoric and the actions of the parties. 
The analysis is conducted based on case studies from different policy areas from 
the years 2012-2015 that are connected to Russia or Russian interests, such as 
- energy policy projects (construction of Visaginas nuclear power plant 
201238, LNG terminal in Klaipėda39 May-June 2012),  
- military issues (reorganization of the structure of the army and increasing 
its number 2014, laws related to state of war and extraordinary situations, 
reintroduction of conscription 2015),  
                                                          
38 The Visaginas nuclear power plant was planned to be constructed in order to replace the Ignalina nuclear 
power plant that used to cover 70% of the country’s electrical demand and had to be finally closed in 2009 
because of safety reasons on the basis of an agreement with the European Union. The purpose of the 
Visaginas project was to secure the electric energy missing because the closure of Ignalina and to secure 
energetic independence from Russia.  
39 The Klaipėda liquefied natural gas floating storage and regasification unit terminal (LNG FSRU) started 
its operation in the end of 2014 and it consists of the vessel Independence that is a floating LNG storage 
terminal combined with a regasification unit. LNG is supplied by Statoil on the basis of a five year 
agreement. The goal of the project was to break the monopoly of Gazprom as the sole supplier of gas in 
Lithuania, push down the price of gas by creating competition on the Lithuanian market and to secure 
energetic independence from Russia by providing an alternative supply opportunity.   
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- foreign policy (crisis in Ukraine and resolutions supporting Ukraine and 
condemning Russia 2014-201540 as well as creating a common military 
unit with Poland and Ukraine; the murder of Boris Nemtsov 201541; 
general discussion on Lithuania’s foreign and defence policy questions 
2015).  
These topics are all related to geopolitical issues, as the parliamentarians 
themselves emphasize in their discussion about geopolitics that the focus of security has 
shifted from energy independence to military issues42. As it can be seen, cases were 
selected from recent years  because with the change of the geopolitical situation and 
Russia becoming more assertive there were several cases when Lithuanian domestic 
issues had a strong geopolitical dimension.  
Stenographic records are available from the website of the Lithuanian parliament: 
http://www3.lrs.lt/pls/inter/w5_sale.kad_ses . Protocols as well as voice and video 
recordings are also available, but for the ease of processing, stenographs will be used as 
the basis of analysis as they need no transcription.  
 
Selection of cases 
 
Some of the debates are centred around laws while some are about the adoption 
of strategies, resolutions or are just discussions on various topics. Of course, laws have a 
much greater importance than any other topics as they directly influence the life of people 
and much more public attention is paid to them, so accordingly these debates are much 
more intense and parties are much more likely to present their standpoint and confront 
other opinions because of the weight of the topic. Therefore it needs to be considered that 
                                                          
40 In the first resolution, the parliament expressed its sympathy with the protesters in Ukraine and urged the 
reaction of the EU. The second resolution was supporting the independence and territorial sovereignty of 
Ukraine and condemned the military aggression by Russia, underlining that Russia’s actions pose a threat 
not only to Ukraine but also to EU and NATO countries, supported the sanctions against Russia, giving 
Ukraine financial assistance and perspective of membership and re-evaluating the security situation in 
Europe and putting an end to Russia’s aggression against Ukraine.  
41 In this resolution, the Lithuanian parliament expressed its condolences to the relatives and fellows of 
Boris Nemtsov and called on the international community to exert pressure on the Russia that the murder 
would be investigated and those responsible for it brought to justice. 
42 http://www3.lrs.lt/pls/inter/w5_sale.fakt_pos?p_fakt_pos_id=-500923  
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the lower activity of some parties does not necessarily mean the lack of interest of the 
party in that particular topic.  
The volume of all the texts of the stenographs comprising the debates in question 
about 85 000 words (~130 A4 pages). 
Of course, the text of related laws, resolutions etc. will be also used to get a proper 
understanding of the object of the debate. These texts are also available from the webpage 
of the Lithuanian parliament.  
 
 
3.2. Methods of Analysis 
 
3.2.1 Content Analysis 
 
The method of content analysis will be used for the purpose of the research. The 
purpose of content analysis is ‘classifying large amounts of text into an efficient number 
of categories that represent similar meanings (Weber, 1990)’ that can represent explicit 
or inferred communication (Hsieh and Shannon, 2007, p. 111). The main goal of content 
analysis is ‘to provide knowledge and understanding of the phenomenon under study 
(Downe-Wamboldt, 1992, p. 314)’ (Hsieh and Shannon, 2007, p. 111). As it can be 
qualitative, quantitative (quantification of the communicative content (Titscher et al., 
2000, p. 56): counting the occurrences of specific textual elements), directed or 
summative (Hsieh and Shannon, 2007), content analysis is rather a research strategy than 
a single method of text analysis (Titscher et al., 2000, p. 55).  
Content analysis seems suitable for analysing the participation of the two parties 
in the debates, as it will give an idea about their activity, interest in topics having a 
geopolitical connotation as well as what kind of strategies they use when speaking up in 
these discussions, e. g. whether they mention Russia, or – as populist parties – rather 
divert the topic in order to blame the government, or to other issues that people care more 
about, and most importantly, whether they try to appeal to the pro-Soviet/anti-Soviet 
cleavage in connection with these issues. Briefly, content analysis should give an 
overview of how these parties behave in discussions with a geopolitical dimensions.  
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Content analysis was in its beginning oriented to the impact of content upon 
audience (Harold D. Lasswell) (Titscher et al., 2000, p. 57). In analysing parliamentary 
debates, the assessment of the impact is hardly possible, as these speeches are not so much 
aimed at making an impact but have a declarative nature.  However, later the focus shifted 
from the result of communication process to the identification and classification of the 
characteristics of the textual material (Titscher et al., 2000, p. 58). 
It is emphasized that researchers conducting conventional content analysis should 
avoid using preconceived categories but should rather allow categories flow from the data 
(Hsieh and Shannon, 2007, p. 112). In my case, I am using a pre-set definition of populism 
and assumptions on how populist parties behave based on cleavage theory and the 
specifics of Lithuanian politics (it hopefully helps to structure the analysis and set the 
focus), however, I am not using pre-set categories but try to set up the categories paying 
close attention to the texts.  
This method is a mix of quantitative and qualitative content analysis as it does not 
merely count the voting pattern or occurrences of certain words/phrases but also contains 
an analysis of underlying ideas and tactics. Discourse analysis did not seem suitable due 
to the limited length and usual intellectual shallowness of the speeches. 
 
 
 3.2.2 Coding 
 
 After the preliminary scanning of the debates, the use of the following categories 
seemed purposeful: 
 
Categories 
- Issues:  
o IS1 – Visaginas nuclear power plant;  
o IS2 – Klaipėda LNG terminal ;  
o IS3 – reorganization of the structure of the army;  
o IS4 – laws related to state of war and extraordinary situations;  
o IS5 – conscription;  
o IS6A – crisis in Ukraine; IS6B – creation of common military unit 
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o IS7 –  murder of Nemtsov;  
o IS8 – discussion about geopolitics 
- Number of speakers: S Ø/1, 2, 3 … 
- Length of the speech: L1 short (1-2 sentences)/ L2 medium (~ 6-8 sentences)/ 
L3 long (longer than medium) 
- Who is speaking: W (1– important person in the party/ 2 –specialist of the topic) 
- Number of speakers NS (1 – one/ 2+ - more than one) 
- Do they agree with the proposal A 1/Ø 
- Do they mention Russia:  R 1/Ø 
- What other topics they bring out:  
o failures/faults of the former government/opposition OT1 F 
o social problems OT2 SP 
o burden of the population OT3 BP 
o economic issues OT4 EC 
o emigration  OT5 EM 
o other internal problems OT6 IP 
o past issues/history OT7 PH 
o minorities OT8 M 
o human rights OT9 HR 
 
- Proposals:  
o urging for more (international) activity P1 INT 
o cooperation with neighbours P2 N 
o missing EU-engagement P3 EU 
 
- Ideas:  
o mediation between East and West ID1 EW 
o missing better bargaining with Russia ID2 R1B 
o the benefits yielded by Russia (financial, economic, etc.) ID3 R2B 
o drawing attention to (threatening with) Russia’s reaction (’it’s not worth 
to mess with the Russian bear’) ID4 R3R 
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o pointing out that double standards are applied in dealing with Russia 
(’we criticize the shortcomings of Russian democracy, but do we do the 
same in cases of other countries?’) ID5 R4DS 
o the EU/NATO as a colonizer ID6 EU 
o Soviet nostalgia ID7 SN 
 
- Tactics 
o downgrading tactic (e. g. proposing a less sharp formulation of 
documents) T1 DG 
o ‘paying lip service’: supporting a project that is not being discussed right 
now (e. g. supporting nuclear plant when LNG terminal is being 
discussed) T2 LS 
o ‘turning the tables’ tactic: accusing the other side of being pro-Russian 
T3 TT 
 
Most of the categories are self-explanatory. The length of the speech of course has 
to be assessed having in mind the allocated time for each contribution based on the rules 
of the Seimas. Although the fact that a party agrees or does not agree with the proposal 
might seem the most important, from the point of view of this research it is even more 
interesting how they argument, what kind of ideas, topics they bring out, as it may shed 
some light on the ideas and strategy of the parties and shows whether their rhetoric has 
similarities with the official Russian discourse. It may also be telling, what other topics 
they mention in connection with these issues, if and how they try to divert the discourse. 
Ideas are the element that may yield the most information of how the parties see Russia 
and their understanding of Lithuanian-Russian relations. The category of ‘tactics’ may be 
somewhat arbitrary, as it is constructed by the analyst on the basis of the contributions 
and general behaviour of a party in the debate. It means that the parties take actions on 
the basis of a pre-set plan to achieve goals that are not explicitly stated. The notion of 
tactics presupposes that the parties have goals that they seek to achieve with covert (not 
manifest, purposeful) methods. (Although it does not seem far-fetched when thinking of 
the nature of party politics.) 
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Occurrences of elements belonging to different categories are counted in order to 
represent how prominent these elements are in the rhetoric of the party. If one element is 
mentioned several times by a speaker, it does count as different occurrences, unless it is 
mentioned more than once in the same utterance.  
 
 
3.3. Problems and Limitations 
 
First of all, although the title suggests that the research deals with populist parties 
in Lithuania in general, it has to be noted that only two parties are examined, although 
there may be more parties that have populist features (The Way of Courage, Liberal 
Movement etc.). The two parties were chosen as the biggest and most influential 
Lithuanian parties that are usually labelled ‘populist’.  
Secondly, applying the populist label may not be entirely accurate in all aspects. 
Of course each party and each political system is different, and parties, especially 
governing parties are in a process of constant transformation: being part of a governing 
coalition probably causes parties to become ‘more mainstream’; in my opinion, Labour 
Party is in the process of becoming more mainstream. On the other hand, what matters 
for my research, is not the label of being populist, but what I would like to explore is 
whether they base their strategy on societal cleavages and whether advocating pro-
Russian/Eurosceptic stance is connected to such cleavages, especially the pro-Soviet/anti-
Soviet one.  
The evaluation of the speeches is inevitably subjective: for example, in case of 
objecting a project and proposing modifications, it can be considered either well-founded 
objection or an attempt to sabotage or postpone the realization of the project (as it is often 
done by the government/the party that has created the project). An accusation that 
especially Homeland Union often gets is that if someone opposes their actions or 
proposals, those immediately get the label ‘pro-Russian’ or ‘Kremlin agents’ from them. 
If the analyst is looking for signs of pro-Russian behaviour, it is quite easy to see cunning 
sabotaging tactics even there where we have to do with technical questions or sincere 
attempts to improve the proposal. Therefore in order to avoid these pitfalls, such ideas 
have to be evaluated carefully, with paying attention to all the relevant circumstances of 
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the issue, but the subjectivity of the analyst cannot be excluded completely. It is also 
important to note that the fact of not agreeing to a project itself is not automatically 
evaluated in the analysis as pro-Russian behaviour, but attention is paid rather to the 
argumentation: if it deals with details closely connected to the project, it is regarded as 
neutral content. The analysis is based on the assumption that there are commonly accepted 
geopolitical norms that prevent parties from uttering an explicitly pro-Russian rhetoric as 
it would lead to ostracism; therefore they have to pack their ideas into other issues or 
apply tactics that can lessen the weight or scope of the projects.  
Another aspect that deserves attention is the role of personalities in party factions. 
The individual attitudes of party members towards Russia and their rhetoric can greatly 
vary and do not necessarily represent the official stance of the party; on the other hand, 
although these individual effects cannot be filtered out, it is assumed that speakers 
generally try to conform with the main direction of their party. Outlier cases are not 
regarded as fully representative (e. g. one MP declaring himself pro-Russian is not 
interpreted as the whole party being openly pro-Russian).  
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CHAPTER 4: ANALYSIS OF EMPIRICAL DATA 
 
 
4.1 Energy Policy Projects  
4.2 Military Issues  
4.3 Foreign Policy  
 
 This chapter contains the analysis of stenographic records of the debates described 
in the previous chapter. In this chapter, a more detailed description of the debates and the 
connected documents (bills, modification proposals, resolutions) will be given. After that, 
results are analysed according to the different categories (topics, ideas, strategies). 
 
 
4.1 Energy Policy 
 
 The two earliest debates (from 2012) deal with energy security issues: the creation 
of the Klaipėda liquefied natural gas floating storage and regasification unit terminal and 
the construction of the Visaginas nuclear power plant.  
 
LNG terminal  
 
The Klaipėda liquefied natural gas floating storage and regasification unit terminal 
(LNG FSRU) started its operation in the end of 2014 and consists of the vessel 
Independence that is a floating LNG storage terminal combined with a regasification unit. 
LNG is supplied by Statoil on the basis of a five year agreement. The goal of the project 
was to break the monopoly of Gazprom as the sole supplier of gas in Lithuania, push 
down the price of gas by creating competition on the Lithuanian market and to secure 
energetic independence from Russia by providing an alternative supply opportunity. 
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  The law recognizes the terminal as an object of strategic importance for national 
security. The state should own at least 2/3 of the shares in the implementing company. 
The law determines that 25% of the gas consumed in Lithuania has to come from the 
terminal (another 25% should be bought from Gazprom). The cost of the installation and 
operation of the terminal would be included in the natural gas transmission service price. 
(Which means that the population would cover a big part of it.) 
The project was criticized because its hastiness, high costs and lack of 
transparency: the ship is registered in an offshore financial centre (Singapore)43.  
The debate of the law on the liquefied natural gas terminal took place on 17th of 
May, 7th of June and 12th of June in 2012.  
The amendment was adopted by a great majority: 82 votes for, 1 against and 1 
abstained.  
 
The coding tables of the LNG debate (tables Nr. 1-3) can be found in the Appendices. 
 
Both the Labour Party and the Order and Justice were moderately active in the 
debate with three speakers each, although the latter speaking multiples times. They both 
agreed that the terminal is necessary, but criticized certain details, especially the financial 
aspects and the fact that the government made the decision without asking the people 
and/or the parliament. The MPs did stick to the topic and did not attempt to divert the 
debate to other issues. The opposition parties (including the two parties in question and 
the Social Democrats), were missing the cooperation with the other two Baltic states and 
EU support for the project; it was especially prominent in the rhetoric of the Order and 
Justice. While other opposition parties were heavily criticizing the lack of transparency 
of the project, the Order and Justice mainly concentrated on the high price of gas from 
the terminal and the lack of cooperation with the neighbouring countries and support from 
the EU.  
The Order and Justice also voiced different ideas related to Russia that are 
interesting from our point of view:  
                                                          
43https://www.marinetraffic.com/en/ais/details/ships/shipid:726727/mmsi:563614000/vessel:INDEPEND
ENCE  
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- that Lithuania should mediate between the East and the West (‘: ‘we will 
win politically if we prove that the three Baltic states are not only 
Russophobes or can not only destroy monuments but they are capable of 
cooperating for a long time and become mediators between the East and 
the West’’; ‘we could cooperate with the Latvians in building a terminal 
and a power plant and be necessary both for the East and for the West’44);  
- that better bargaining would have been needed with Russia (‘Latvians and 
Estonians already now receive gas 15-20% cheaper, it shows that it is 
possible to agree’);  
- the benefits yielded by Russia (‘liquefied gas will be at least 3 cents more 
expensive than the gas provided by Gazprom’); 
- that the country should consider the reaction of Russia (Gazprom) (‘what 
steps does Lithuania plan if in case of the implementation of the terminal, 
Gazprom decides to close the gas pipe for Lithuania’);  
- and pointing to the double standards regarding Russia (what is the 
difference if Bahrein is a monopolist or Gazprom is a monopolist?’). 
 
 
 Visaginas 
 
 The Visaginas nuclear power plant was planned to be constructed in order to 
replace the outdated Ignalina nuclear power plant that used to cover 70% of the country’s 
electrical demand and had to be finally closed in 2009 because of safety reasons on the 
basis of an agreement with the European Union. The purpose of the Visaginas project 
was to secure the electric energy missing because of the closure of Ignalina and to secure 
energetic independence from Russia45. The Lithuanian state agreed with the Japanese 
                                                          
44 Citations from the debates without the name of the speakers are given in a loose translation in order to 
reproduce the most important ideas of the parties.  
45 Almost simultaneously with the Visaginas project, Russia and Belarus also began planning the 
construction of nuclear plants, very close to their borders with Lithuania (in Neman, Kaliningrad oblast and 
in Ostrovets). The motivation behind these projects was to make up for the energy deficit in the region 
occurring because of the shutdown of Ignalina. (“Russia plans nuclear project for Kaliningrad,” 2008) The 
proposed facility in Neman would produce far more electricity than it is used in the Kaliningrad area. The 
surplus was intended to be exported, or used for industrial purposes. The target of the export was of course, 
Lithuania and Poland: power from the Kaliningrad region would be cheaper than home-produced. It was 
clear that three power plants is disproportionate in such a small area, that is why the Russian and Belarussian 
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company Hitachi about the plans of construction (The same company that together with 
Toshiba and General Electric was the supplier of Fukushima nuclear power plant.). The 
end of construction was planned for 2018-2020. The advisory referendum in 2012 
rejected the project and the realisation was stopped.  
 The debate that took place on the 19th of June 2012 is centred around an 
amendment of the law on nuclear energy. It contains the approval of the parliament to 
build a nuclear power plant in Visaginas by a company registered in Lithuania. The 
implementing company can consist of either a national investor and/or a national investor 
together with a strategic investor (providing at least 20% of necessary investment) and/or 
strategic partner (a legal person controlled by a state supporting the project). The national 
investor must have at least 34% of the capital of the implementing company. The 
implementing company would get tax exemptions. The implementing company would 
cover 50% of the electric energy tariff for residents of the surrounding areas in a 50 km 
circle.  
 One of the Christian Democrat MPs mentioned that the social democrats were 
very strongly criticising the proposal and calling it a geopolitical project. This MP 
acknowledged that it is indeed a geopolitical project, as the decision would very strongly 
influence whether Lithuania remains in the Russian energetic space or creates its own 
energy policy. He also mentioned the State Security Agency (VSD) said that foreign 
special services make great efforts to impede the project.46 The debate took place not long 
before the 2012 elections that have probably influenced the rhetoric of the speakers.  
 The amendment of the law on the nuclear power plant was discussed on 19th  June 
2012. The amendment was adopted by 56 votes for, 23 against and 30 abstained. Other 
related amendments were adopted as well.  
 The debate is described here in more detail than the others because it was the only 
one of the cases studied when not all the parties agreed to a project.  
                                                          
power plants were seen as counter projects that would make the construction of Visaginas superfluous and 
this way would chain the Baltic states, especially Lithuania to Russia regarding electric energy, especially 
because according to data from 2011, the Kaliningrad region was self-sufficient regarding electricity 
already back then. (“Kaliningrad plan for Baltic States market,” 2008) ; (“Russia plans nuclear plant for 
Kaliningrad exclave,” 2008); (Menkiszak, 2013) 
46 http://www3.lrs.lt/pls/inter2/dokpaieska.showdoc_l?p_id=427705  
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 Members of parliament are allowed to participate in the discussion of bills with 
speeches that are maximum 5 minutes long, or, if they speak on behalf of the faction – 7 
minutes. After the voting, MPs can also comment on the results.    
It is interesting that quite a lot of MPs spoke against their faction’s position. 
 The speakers on behalf of Order and Justice and the Labour Party were Valentinas 
Mazuronis and Kęstutis Daukšys. Mazuronis was the head of the parliamentary faction 
of OJ at that time while Daukšys was the head of Nuclear Energy Committee.  
 V. Mazuronis said on behalf of the faction that although they did not oppose the 
use of nuclear energy, they could not agree with the project because they insisted that it 
should have the approval of the people (demand of direct democracy). He also reminded 
the affair of the sale of the Mažeikių nafta oil company and drew attention to the lack of 
information and uncertainties of technical details.  
 K. Daukšys approved the project in the name of the faction, and also emphasized 
that the state has to convince the people of the project and a referendum should take place. 
He pointed out that the main question is whether the country wants to produce its own 
electric energy or buy it from its neighbours, whether from Poles, Russians, Swedes or 
someone else. It means the party does not regard energy independence from Russia as 
principally different from dependence from another country that is a central element of 
the rhetoric Homeland Union who perceive it as a threat to national security. (Daukšys 
also said: ’Today, there will always be energy dependence on one or another’.) On the 
other hand, he said that Lithuania has to be connected to the European electricity grid 
(ENTSO-E), otherwise ‘Lithuania would remain on Russia’s side’. The fraction initiated 
a bill that would oblige the government to ask for the approval of the parliament after the 
projection stage.    
 
The most active speaker of Order and Justice, Julius Veselka, openly confessed a 
year ago in a debate about the interpellation of the energy minister A. Sekmokas that he 
was pro-Russian. (‘I am pro-Russian, I confess.’)47. Therefore it is not surprising that the 
ideas that can be classified as pro-Russian all come from him.  
 
                                                          
47 http://www3.lrs.lt/pls/inter3/dokpaieska.showdoc_l?p_id=394038 11.03.2011 
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The coding tables of the Visaginas debate (tables Nr. 4-6) can be found in the 
Appendices. 
 
In this debate, the Labour Party was very passive (two speakers), while Order and 
Justice was more active (five speakers), perhaps because they were opposing the project.  
Both parties (like other opposition parties) mentioned faults of the conservative 
government regarding energy policy, with Order and Justice being more active in this 
than Labour Party (which can be also explained by their higher overall activity).  
The Order and Justice again voiced ideas that can provide interesting insights 
regarding their relation to Russia:  
- the benefits yielded by Russia (‘now we are lucky only because we import 
cheap electricity from Russia’); 
- that the country should consider the reaction of Russia (‘Because 
otherwise it will be like this: those angry little people only know how to 
demolish monuments, but where it is needed to agree on something for a 
couple of decades in advance, they fail’);  
- depicting the EU as a colonizer (‘Whenever one empire falls, the territories 
that become free are occupied by another empire. We would have been 
admitted to the European Union with all the ignalinas and everything else. 
(…) When I was once in the European Union and the Committee was 
negotiating with the experts of nuclear energy, with the Directorate, they 
openly told me that we demand the closure of the Ignalina nuclear power 
plant because that it produces too cheap electricity’) 
- Soviet nostalgia (‘we have inherited a golden thing from the Soviet times: 
the nuclear plant, the replacement value of which together with the 
infrastructure is about 40 billion litas. It needed particularly bad abilities 
to turn it to a heap of rubbish’) 
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4.2 Military Issues 
 
There are a couple of laws and law amendments related to military issues 
(conscription, state of war and emergency) that were discussed during 2014 and 2015.  
The law on the principal structure of the army and the number of soldiers is about 
moderately increasing the number of soldiers serving in the Lithuanian army including 
professional soldiers, volunteers, reservists and senior officers (generals etc.). The law 
was discussed on 10th July 2014 and entered into force by 1 January 2015. 
The amendment of the same law discussed on 19th of March 2015 restored 
conscription to the army temporarily, for five years (about 3000-3500 people per year).  
The argumentation of the defence minister (LSDP) was that because of the geopolitical 
situation, it is necessary to fill up the reserves of the army but at the moment it would be 
impossible to do it only with professionals. After five years, however, the creation of an 
army consisting of entirely professionals would be possible.  
The amendment of the same law from 9th June 2015 has again raised the general 
number of soldiers, including conscripts for 2016.  
The amendment of the same law discussed on 23rd of June 2015 cancels the 
liquidation of the conscript army in 2015 as the initiators of the amendment had 
acknowledged that further discussion is needed on this question.  
Some amendments of the law on compulsory military service concern the status 
of conscripts and guarantees, benefits and exemptions yielded to them. Another 
amendment deals with the method of conscription, the selection criteria48 (discussed on 
9th and 14th  of April 2015). 
All these laws as well as those concerning the state of war and extraordinary 
situations (mobilization, how the parliament should work, etc.) were adopted with a great 
majority (except for the first one). It shows that there is a wide consensus on these matters 
(or that parties do not dare to voice a different stance on this issues because they fear 
                                                          
48 According to the amendment, young men of 19-26 years of age will be conscripted, the list of 
actual conscripts is determined by using a computer programme. It was criticized that chance plays a big 
role and thus it is unpredictable whether someone will be conscripted. 
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ostracism.) Also, the representatives of the parties were less active than in case of the 
energy policy projects. Therefore I decided to code the debates of all these laws together. 
It also has to be taken into consideration that while in 2012, when the energy 
policy projects were discussed, the Labour Party and Order and Justice were in 
opposition, in 2014-2015, when all the other issues are discussed, they are in the 
government, so of course, less eager to oppose the projects presented by the government.  
 
The coding tables of the military issues debate (tables Nr. 7-9) can be found in 
the Appendices. 
 
The faction of Labour Party was more active (with seven speakers) in this debate 
than Order and Justice (four speakers).  
Order and Justice has reminded several times that former governments have given 
up and did not restore conscript army and the conservative government had taken loans 
with unfavourable conditions but did not spend on defence. The speaker of Order and 
Justice, the controversial P. Gražulis also brought up a historical parallel (connection 
between the social inequality and military defeat in the 1940s) and mentioned the role of 
police and army during the gay parades when discussing the restructuring of the army, 
accusing them with turning against the ’patriotic youth’ while protecting the ’colourful 
ones’ (LGBT).  
He was also using the ‘turning the tables around’ tactic saying that while the 
conservatives (Homeland Union) accuse everyone criticising their projects to be a ‘friend 
of the Russians’, in fact it was them who decreased the financing of the army therefore it 
is them who work for Moscow.  
 
Discussion about foreign and defence policy 
 
This discussion took place on the 18th of June 2015. It was the first time such 
discussion was held but several MPs expressed their wish that it should become a 
tradition. The discussion relates to the agreement of parliamentary parties on the strategic 
guidelines of foreign and security policy for 2014-2020.  
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In his introductory speech, the head of the state security and defence committee 
pointed out that the nature of threats has changed: while a couple of years before energy 
security was emphasized, now threats concerning informational security are more 
noticeable. The discussion was started by the reports of the defence minister, the head of 
the State Security Department (VSD) and the head of the Second Operative Department 
at the Ministry of Defence. All the factions could voice their opinion by one speaker (7 
minutes). 
 
The coding tables of the discussion about foreign and security policy (tables Nr. 
10-13) can be found in the Appendices.  
 
The most pro-Russian speech was made by the MP of the Way of Courage party 
but the representative of Order and Justice said that their opinion match to a great extent49.  
 The speaker of Order and Justice, Petras Gražulis again mentioned that the 
conservative government has decreased the defence budget and failed to restore 
conscription. He urged cooperation with EU countries so that the EU and NATO would 
be more unified and strict regarding Russia.  And turned the table against the Homeland 
Union again saying that it is their policy which is constantly escalating war and inciting 
discord therefore it is needed by Russia.  
 
 
4.3 Foreign policy: Ukraine and the Murder of Boris Nemtsov 
 
In its resolution adopted on the 23rd of January 2014, the Lithuanian parliament 
expressed its sympathy with the protesters in Ukraine and urged the reaction of the EU. 
In its second resolution adopted on 13th of March 2014, the Seimas was supporting the 
independence and territorial sovereignty of Ukraine and condemned the military 
aggression by Russia, underlining that Russia’s actions pose a threat not only to Ukraine 
but also to EU and NATO countries; the resolution supports the sanctions against Russia, 
giving Ukraine financial assistance and perspective of membership, re-evaluating the 
                                                          
49 http://www3.lrs.lt/pls/inter/w5_sale.fakt_pos?p_fakt_pos_id=-500923  
 
67 
 
security situation in Europe and putting an end to Russia’s aggression against Ukraine. It 
also emphasized NATO’s role in ending the conflict and guaranteeing security in Europe, 
especially in the Baltic states. The resolution contains a recommendation to the 
government to seek permanent NATO military presence in Lithuania and to strengthen 
the country's defence capabilities and to increase national defence expenditure. 
The law dated 12th of March 2015 ratifies the agreement of the governments of 
Lithuania, Poland and Ukraine about the creation of a common military unit (one brigade 
consisting of three battalions). It was planned to serve educational purposes as well as to 
participate in common military exercises and perhaps UN missions. 
 
In its resolution from 16th of March 2015, the Lithuanian parliament expressed its 
condolences to the relatives and fellows of Boris Nemtsov and called on the international 
community to exert pressure on Russia that the murder would be investigated and those 
responsible for it brought to justice. 
As there was not much debate about these projects, so it would not be sufficient 
material to analyse if they were handled separately, I analyse all these foreign policy 
debates together because of this technical reason. 
 
The coding tables of the foreign policy debates (tables Nr. 14-17) can be found 
in the Appendices.  
 
Labour Party and Order and Justice were both moderately active in the debate with 
three speakers each, mostly specialists of foreign policy topics.  
Order and Justice was repeatedly missing cooperation with the neighbouring 
countries: in case of the resolution about the crisis in Ukraine, the representative of Order 
and Justice asked if Latvians and Estonians have also accepted a similar documents; in 
case of the creation of the common Lithuania-Polish-Ukrainian military unit, someone 
from the party asked whether/why the other two Baltic states do not want to participate 
in it. These questions suggests as if Lithuania could only do something if the other two 
countries also do the same or participate in the same project.  
 In the case of the Ukraine crisis, both parties brought up the ‘double standards’ 
idea: the speaker of the Labour Party asked if the resolution of the parliament was not an 
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interference into the work of Russian law enforcement institutions while it is condemned 
if it is done within Lithuania; one MP from Order and Justice drew a parallel between 
referenda in Crimea and Kosovo, Bosnia and Ireland suggesting that these should be 
judged similarly.  
 The Labour Party wanted to include in the resolution a passage that the conflict 
should be settled in a peaceful way; it can be perceived as downgrading tactic as it might 
have decreased the weight of the document.   
 
Summary 
 
The summarizing codification tables of all the topics (tables Nr. 18-23) can be 
found in the Appendices. 
 
 
4.3 Discussion 
 
As it can be seen from the summarizing codification tables in the appendices, both 
parties supported all the projects/proposals, except for the Visaginas nuclear power plant, 
which was not supported by the faction of Order and Justice party, however, the 
representative of the party who was the most active from the faction during the debate, 
was supporting the project, he even was the one who made the ‘for’ speech before the 
voting50.  
The activity of both parties during the discussions was roughly equal, with fifteen 
speakers each in total. (Those MPs who were speaking as representatives of parliamentary 
committees or ministries were not counted.) Compared to the two largest parties 
(Homeland Union and Social Democrats, especially the former), however, they were 
slightly less active. In my opinion, it can be attributed to the competition of these two 
main parties: they try to oppose/criticize each other’s proposals, even if they basically 
agree and use this opportunity to point to the failures of the government led by the other 
party.  
                                                          
50 It is a common practice in the Lithuanian parliament that in the end of the debate, before the voting takes 
place, one MP speaks for and one against the proposal.  
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The speakers from both parties were perhaps more often specialists of the topic 
than leading figures, however, it is sometimes difficult to separate; anyhow, no significant 
pattern regarding this category was observed.  
Further categories were divided to four groups: other topics brought up by the 
speakers, proposals made by them, and ideas and tactics that can be identified from their 
speeches. Of course, most of the speeches deal with the specific details of the proposals 
so they could be called ’objective’ contributions. As these do not carry information from 
my point of view, I disregard them in this analysis and concentrate only on those elements 
of the contributions that carry some information regarding my research questions.  
 
Other topics  
 
As it is evident, both parties (just like the other parties in the parliament) bring up 
other topics, most often criticizing the current or the former government. It is a widely 
known method to use different topics as an opportunity to voice things that the party 
wants to emphasize and to advance their agenda. It seems that Order and Justice uses this 
strategy more often. (However, other parties, especially the Social Democrats also apply 
it frequently, that is part of the ’eternal duel’ between them and the Homeland Union.) 
Apart from bringing up failures of governments, they once brought up a historical parallel 
(connection between the social inequality and military defeat in the 1940s) and drew 
attention to other internal issues (P. Gražulis who is famous for his anti-gay actions 
mentioned the role of police and army during the gay parades when discussing the 
restructuring of the army), but bringing up other topics or diverting the discussion is not 
a significant tactic applied by either of the parties.  
 
Proposals  
 
The question of proposals looks more interesting. Proposal means here not only 
suggestions but also aspects that the parties miss from the projects. For example, if a party 
supports a project but misses cooperation with the EU or neighbouring countries, it is 
categorised as a proposal. Both parties have such proposals, but again, Order and Justice 
was much more active in this respect. Most often it was the participation of the EU and 
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cooperation with the neighbours in case of the nuclear power plant and especially the 
LNG terminal that the party was missing. Of course, there is nothing surprising in it, as 
such large projects are often implemented together with other countries and with EU 
support, especially in the case of small countries. However, what can make us think is the 
fact that this element was missed almost exclusively by Order and Justice. Why is 
cooperation with the neighbours and the EU such a priority for this party? It is purely 
speculation, but forcing cooperation with the neighbours (and/or the EU) can also be one 
method to set projects back, because coordination with other countries usually makes 
everything slower and more complicated (e. g. the case of Rail Baltica) compared to the 
case if only one government has to make the decision on its own and get approval from 
the parliament. On the other hand, In the case of the resolution concerning Ukraine and 
Russia, the question ‘Did Latvians and Estonians do the same?’ implies that Lithuania 
should only act if its neighbours have the same opinion and do the same which again 
makes any kind of quick and independent action more difficult. On the other hand, when 
Order and Justice asks why the EU is not financing the project, it sends the message that 
the EU does not care about Lithuania and is not willing to help.  
 
Tactics 
 
To some extent these ‘proposals’ can serve the same purpose as the different 
tactics: to try to impede the projects but in the same time maintain the pretence that they 
are not pro-Russian and they are not opposing the project. As it was already mentioned 
in the methodology chapter, tactics is the most arbitrary category of all, because it is not 
something that is explicitly present in the text, but is constructed by the analyst. In case 
of the ‘lip service’ tactic, it was actually identified by one of the MPs of Homeland Union, 
who accused Order and Justice during the debate of the LNG terminal that one of their 
speakers supports the nuclear power plant when the LNG terminal is discussed, but in 
reality he does not support any of the projects. Later this statement proved to be wrong, 
because the representative of OJ in question (J. Veselka) was one of the firmest supporters 
of the nuclear plant. However, in case of one of his colleagues (E. Klumbys) it was true: 
he supported the idea of the nuclear plant during the discussion of the LNG terminal, but 
just one week later, during the debate of the power plant he was against the project. The 
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fact that it was pointed out by a rival politician can be perceived as decreasing the 
credibility of the existence of this tactic, but on the other hand, probably the MPs know 
each other’s tactic better than anyone else, so it may be worth to consider such ideas.  
The faction of the Order and Justice in two cases turned the accusations of the 
Homeland Union around and they said that it is not them, but the Homeland Union who 
are working for Russia, as their decisions harm the country (‘turning the tables’ tactic). 
Of course, it can be the subject of debate what serves the interests of the Kremlin. 
However, it does sound like the party wants to redefine the word ‘pro-Russian’ and it 
resembles more of a tactic than an argumentation.  
One tactic also applied by Labour Party is downgrading: they agree with the 
project, but propose such modifications that lower the scope of it: for example, in case of 
the resolution about Ukraine, MPs of the Labour Party wanted to include a phrase that the 
conflict should be regulated in a peaceful way (although, as Homeland Union and the 
Social Democrats have remarked, the text of the resolution was not militarist). Of course, 
including peaceful regulation sounds like an innocent proposal, but it does decrease the 
weight of the resolution if any kind of military action is a priori excluded. One manoeuvre 
in the same debate was a proposal from Order and Justice to modify the text: they would 
have deleted the sentence where the Lithuanian parliament supports the position of the 
Ukrainian government that the decision of the Crimean government to call a referendum 
on the status of Crimea conflicts the constitution of the country  – and consequently the 
results would be illegal and void – and would have inserted that the new Ukrainian 
government should return to the agreement signed on the 21st of February 2014 between 
Yanukovich, the opposition and the foreign affairs ministers of France, Germany and 
Poland and that the investigation of the shootings in Kiev should be started as early as 
possible with the participation of international observers. The use of downgrading tactic 
seems reasonable if the main assumption mentioned in the methodology chapter is 
accepted: the commonly accepted geopolitical norms are so strong that parties avoid 
voicing explicitly pro-Russian rhetoric as it would lead to ostracism; therefore they have 
to pack their ideas into other issues or apply tactics that can lessen the weight or scope of 
the projects.  
 
Ideas  
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The most interesting group of categories is the ideas: these reveal how the parties 
relate to Russia, if they echo the same thoughts that are often heard from official Russian 
sources. Interestingly, such ideas were only present in the rhetoric of the Order and 
Justice, they are completely missing from the speeches of Labour Party.  
The types of ideas illustrated with examples:  
- Lithuania should mediate between the East and the West: Lithuania should build an LNG 
terminal and nuclear plant together with Latvia and with EU support and the Baltic states 
could become mediators between the East and the West. This is an old idea that is, 
however, is rarely outlined in detail, what this ‘mediation’ should mean. What is 
remarkable is that a mediator is not part of any of the parties, so it goes against the idea 
that Lithuania belongs to the West (and EU and NATO membership). 
- missing better bargaining with Russia: if the government would have been better in 
negotiating and bargaining, Lithuania would have more benefits from deals with Russia, 
for example, Latvians and Estonians pay less for the gas because they were bargaining 
better, they think pragmatically and did not spoil their relations with Russia like Lithuania 
did. It implies that good deals with Russia is only the question of bargaining and it is 
better to agree with Russia than to look for alternative ways.  
- benefits yielded by Russia/Soviet nostalgia51: the speaker of the Order and Justice, while 
supporting the nuclear plant project, mentions that ‘now we are lucky only because we 
import cheap electricity from Russia’. It is a way to emphasize Russia’s positive role 
while not committing any ‘geopolitical crime’. A similar remark is that the Ignalina 
nuclear plant was a ‘golden heritage’ from the Soviet times that was turned into ‘a heap 
of rubbish’. This statement clearly appeals to the Soviet nostalgia.  
- drawing attention to Russia’s reaction: ‘we will win politically if we prove that the three 
Baltic states are not only Russophobes or can not only destroy monuments but they are 
capable of cooperating for a long time and become mediators between the East and the 
West’ or ‘if we build the LNG terminal and spoil relations with Russia, we may lose the 
opportunity to import Russian gas’. On the one hand, it mirrors preoccupation with 
Russia’s opinion; on the other hand, it appeals to common fears from the big neighbour 
and implies the notion that it would be better not to provoke Russia.  
                                                          
51 here discussed together because of the resemblance of the two categories 
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- the notion of double standards that is voiced very often by the Kremlin (Headley, 2015). 
‘what is the difference if Bahrein is a monopolist or Gazprom is a monopolist?’; 
‘referendums in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo and Ireland are recognized (...) somehow 
in one case we recognize, in the other case we do not’; ’In Lithuania, according to the 
Constitution, if parliamentarians interfere into the activity of law enforcement 
institutions, it is a crime. But does this mean that if Lithuanian parliamentarians interfere 
into the work of the law enforcement authorities of another country, in this case, into the 
work of the law enforcement institutions of a neighbouring country [Russia], is it not 
regarded as interference?’ 
- depicting the EU/NATO as a colonizer and equating the EU with the Soviet Union: 
‘Whenever one empire falls, the territories that become free are occupied by another 
empire. We would have been admitted to the European Union with all the ignalinas and 
everything else. (…) When I was once in the European Union and the Committee was 
negotiating with the experts of nuclear energy, with the Directorate, they openly told me 
that we demand the closure of the Ignalina nuclear power plant because it produces too 
cheap electricity’; ‘you propose that in the territory of Lithuania would be military bases 
of other states and certain rockets would be stored here’ [it was about NATO presence in 
Lithuania]. The first quote shows not only the notion that the EU is a new colonizer that 
occupies the place of the Soviet Union, but also demonstrates a typical conspiracy theory 
and appeals to the archetype of evil power used by the primitive consciousness to make 
sense of politics that was described by R. Baločkaitė as a worldview that populists make 
use of: the evil power does not want us to have cheap electricity, they do not want that 
we live well. It also reminds the idea nurtured by populists that all problems would be 
easily solved if only the political will was present.’ (Jagers and Walgrave, 2007, p. 338)  
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
The preliminary results show that Labour Party hardly displays any characteristics 
that would qualify them as strikingly pro-Russian, populist or a combination of these two.  
It may indicate that they are on the way of transforming into a mainstream party. 
However, it can be also explained by their lack of interest in geopolitical issues and 
general ideological emptiness that was pointed out by analysts.  
Both parties are somewhat passive compared to Homeland Union and the Social 
Democratic Party. Besides the smaller number of their MPs, it can be explained by their 
lack of a real geopolitical vision; perhaps they do not really dare to vote against or 
contradict these major geopolitical projects because of the general consensus on these 
matters, therefore they do not represent a real counterpole to the mainstream parties, a 
geopolitical alternative but only use these issues to make the most out of Soviet nostalgia 
and Euroscepticism. Also when applying the ‘turning the tables’ tactic, geopolitics is 
often a tool to attack their political enemies.  Probably foreign policy is not a priority for 
the parties either, as is not for the majority of the voters. On the other hand, except from 
the case of energy policy projects, the parties in question were members of the governing 
coalition and therefore, of course would not oppose such projects on which they have 
probably agreed with their coalition partners previously; in case they were in opposition 
or would govern alone, they could possibly have a very different stance – the position of 
the parties is influenced by the prevailing power relations.  
The classical populist ideas: appeal to the people and anti-elite/anti-establishment 
stance are not applied by Order and Justice much more prominently than by other parties: 
critics of the government is a common element of their rhetoric, but so is in the case of 
other parties. Perhaps a more thorough analysis could reveal some difference, but it is not 
the topic of this research. However, they appeal to Soviet nostalgia and Eurosceptic 
sentiments that are based on the pro-Soviet/anti-Soviet cleavage (also indirectly linked to 
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a more favourable stance towards Russia) that can indirectly be linked to anti-
establishment emotions.  
As the essence of populism is an anti-establishment stance, populism in the case 
of Lithuanian foreign policy/geopolitics means scepticism towards the West (EU, US, 
NATO) and a more favourable than usual position regarding Russia.  
What really differentiates Order and Justice from other parties and makes it 
interesting from the point of view of the research are the ideas that can be recognized 
from their rhetoric: these partly show resemblance with the official rhetoric of the 
Kremlin (e.g. double standards) and partly mirror common notions about Russia 
(concerns about Russia’s reaction, Soviet nostalgia). (In fact, most of these ideas probably 
do not originate in the Kremlin but are rather the products of local consciousness, typical 
Central Eastern European ones, e. g. the comparison of the EU and the USSR, the bridge 
position between East and West, the fear of the powerful neighbour). It would mean that 
populism in the case of Order and Justice also means identifying with the mind-set of a 
significant part of the population (having in mind mainly the pro-Soviet ones). In the light 
of the success of the populism in connection with the Brexit-referendum and Donald 
Trump, it seems that voters appreciate if politicians give voice to certain ideas that the 
voters perceive that the elite handles as taboo or contradicting the mainstream, although 
they do not necessarily expect them to act accordingly, the act of voicing itself is 
important (It is perhaps connected to the redemptive face of democracy mentioned by 
Canovan (Canovan, 1999, p. 11)). It may be a protest behaviour and related to the 
phenomenon described by (Ramonaitė, 2007b, p. 33) that disadvantaged social groups 
are so much fed up with the political elite that they welcome any ideas that are 
contradicting the elite discourse: if the elite is anti-Russian, voicing pro-Russian ideas is 
a “trump card”, an easy way to achieve some popularity among these people.   
The geopolitical ideas that can be read from the rhetoric of Order and Justice are 
the following. According to these ideas, Lithuania is not an integral part of the West, but 
is rather positioned between the East and the West and it should function as a mediator 
and make use of its geopolitical position, instead of being part of Western structures, 
because – according to another idea voiced by the party – the EU and NATO are the same 
colonisers as the Soviet Union was. (It resembles the idea voiced by the Kremlin that the 
Baltic states are a poor and decaying periphery of the EU.) However, the Soviet period is 
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judged rather positively as it brought benefits for Lithuania. Russia is regarded as a 
powerful neighbour whose reaction to the actions of Lithuania has to be taken into 
consideration. However, Russia does not only represent a threat, but an opportunity, 
because in case of a pragmatic approach and good bargaining, good relations with Russia 
can bring significant benefits to Lithuania (cheap energy). 
As for the role of the two parties in the geopolitical discourse, in my opinion, they 
represent a voice in geopolitical matters that is to some extent different from the rhetoric 
of the mainstream parties, but they are not consequent enough, do not have a coherent set 
of ideas and lack a firm stance based on it. Their behaviour in geopolitical debates is 
rather opportunistic: it gives the impression that their main aim is not to change the 
geopolitical course of the country but to score points against their political opponents and 
to gain popularity. Although they use some ideas that may originate from the Kremlin 
(‘double standards’, ‘depicting the EU and NATO as colonizers’) there is no sufficient 
evidence to state that they act as agents, the ‘outstretched tentacles’ of Russia. (The 
category of ‘tactics’ has to be handled with condition as it is based on the assumption that 
the parties have a strong pro-Russian stance/work in favour of Russia and use specific 
tactics to cover it.) 
The volume of the analysed debates and the relatively low activity of the 
representatives of the two parties did not allow a very detailed analysis and did not 
provide enough evidence to back up any far-reaching consequences, hence the author had 
to be careful with the conclusions.  
The preliminary results show that further research should be mainly concentrated 
on ideas and probably a larger body of texts should be included in the analysis in order to 
obtain more examples of these ideas and make the results more credible and better 
grounded.  
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APPENDICES 
 
The tables below are based on data (stenographic records) provided on the official 
website of the Lithuanian parliament (http://www3.lrs.lt/pls/inter/w5_sale.kad_ses) and 
were produced applying analysis by the author.  
 
Tables of the LNG terminal debate (tables Nr. 1-3) 
 
table Nr. 1: general characteristics of the debate 
 NS L W A R 
LP 3 n/a n/a 1 Ø 
OJ 3 n/a n/a 1 1 
 
table Nr. 2: category of proposals 
 P1 INT P2 N P3 EU 
LP  1 1 
OJ  4 5 
 
table Nr. 3: category of ideas 
 ID1 
EW 
ID2 
R1B 
ID3 
R2B 
ID4 
R3R 
ID5 
R4DS 
ID6 EU ID7 SN 
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LP        
OJ 1 2 1 2 1   
 
Tables of the nuclear plant debate (tables Nr. 4-6) 
 
table Nr. 4: general characteristics of the debate 
 NS L W A R 
LP 2 n/a 1 1 I 
OJ 5 n/a 2 Ø III 
 
table Nr. 5: category of topics 
 OT1    
F 
OT2  
SP 
OT3 
BP 
OT4 
EC 
OT5 
EM 
OT6   
IP 
OT7 
PH 
OT8   
M 
LP I        
OJ III        
 
table Nr. 6: category of ideas 
 ID1 
EW 
ID2 
R1B 
 
ID3 
R2B 
 
ID4 
R3R 
ID5 
R4DS 
ID6 EU ID7 SN 
LP        
OJ   I I  I I 
 
 
Tables of the military issues debates (tables Nr. 7-9) 
 
table Nr. 7: general characteristics of the debate 
 NS L W A R 
LP 7 n/a 1, 2 1 1 
OJ 4 n/a n/a 1 1 
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table Nr. 8: category of topics 
  OT1    
F 
OT2  
 SP 
OT3 
BP 
OT4 
EC 
OT5 
EM 
OT6   
IP 
OT7  
PH 
OT8   
M 
LP I        
OJ III     I    
 
table Nr. 9: category of tactics 
 T1 DG T2 LS T3 PR T3 TT 
LP    
OJ   I 
 
 
Tables of the discussion about foreign and security policy (tables Nr. 10-13) 
 
table Nr. 10: general characteristics of the debate 
 NS L W A R 
LP n/a n/a 2 n/a n/a 
OJ n/a n/a 1 n/a n/a 
 
table Nr. 11: category of topics 
 OT1    
F 
OT2  
SP 
OT3 
BP 
OT4 
EC 
OT5 
EM 
OT6   
IP 
OT7 
PH 
OT8   
M 
LP         
OJ I       I  
 
table Nr. 12: category of proposals 
 P1 INT P2 N P3 EU 
LP    
OJ I   
 
table Nr. 13: category of tactics 
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 T1 DG T2 LS T3 PRT3 TT 
LP    
OJ   I 
 
Tables of the foreign policy debates (tables Nr. 14-17) 
 
table Nr. 14: general characteristics of the debate 
 NS L W A R 
LP 3 n/a 2 1 n/a 
OJ 3 n/a 2 1 n/a 
 
table Nr. 15: category of proposals 
 P1 INT P2 N P3 EU 
LP    
OJ  II  
 
table Nr. 16: category of ideas 
 ID1 
EW 
ID2 
R1B 
 
ID3 
R2B 
 
ID4 
R3R 
ID5 
R4DS 
ID6 EU ID7 SN 
LP     I I  
OJ     I   
 
table Nr. 17: category of tactics 
 T1 DG T2 LS T3 PRT3 TT 
LP I   
OJ    
 
Summarizing tables (Nr. 18-23) 
 
table Nr. 18: overview of topics 
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 IS1 IS2 IS3 IS4 IS5 IS6 IS7 IS8 
LP 1 1 ?1 1 1 1 1 n/a 
OJ Ø 1 ?1 1 1 1 1 n/a 
Do they agree? 
 
table Nr. 19: general characteristics of the debate - summary 
 NS L W A OT P ID T 
LP 15  n/a 1, 1, 
2, 2, 2 
1 2 2 2 2 
OJ 15 n/a 2, 1, 2 1 
(85%) 
9 12 12 4 
 
table Nr. 20: category of topics - summary 
 OT1    
F 
OT6   
IP 
OT7 
PH 
LP 2   
OJ 7 1  1 
 
table Nr. 21: category of proposals - summary 
 P1 INT P2 N P3 EU 
LP  1 1 
OJ 1 6 5 
 
table Nr. 22: category of ideas - summary 
 ID1 
EW 
ID2 
R1B 
 
ID3 
R2B 
 
ID4 
R3R 
ID5 
R4DS 
ID6  
EU 
ID7  
SN 
LP     1 1  
OJ 1 2 2 3 2 1 1 
 
table Nr. 23: category of tactics - summary 
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 T1 DG T2 LS T3 PRT3 TT 
LP 1   
OJ 1 1 2 
 
 
 
